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NOTES

Foreign Sales Corporations-Subsidies,
Sanctions, and Trade Wars
ABSTRACT

The largest sanctions in the history of the World Trade
Organization, the need to stabilize an ailing economy, and the
need to maintain strong alliances in the face of a new global
war on terrorism are all issues the United States currently faces
in deciding how to resolve its dispute with the European Union
regarding U.S. tax policy. In 1997, the European Union filed a
complaint with the WTO claiming that the then-current U.S. tax
regime violated U.S. international trade agreements. The
European Union contended that the U.S. tax system gave rise to
export-contingent subsidies, in violation of U.S. trade
obligations.
Ultimately, the WTO found that the U.S. tax regime
provided export-contingent subsidies and thus violated U.S.
trade agreements. Although the United States appealed the
decision, the European Union prevailed on appeal. This Note
examines these WTO opinions and the bases for their findings.
After the U.S. tax framework was found to be in violation of
international trade obligations, the United States drafted the
ExtraterritorialIncome Exclusion Act of 2000, which replaced
the U.S. tax laws found to be in violation of U.S. trade
obligations. This Note describes the replacement law and how it
differs from the past tax system.
Although Congress hoped the replacement law would
resolve the tax dispute, the European Union was not satisfied
that the replacement law remedied the trade violations. The
European Union filed a claim with the WTO alleging that the
replacement law continued to violate U.S. trade obligations.
The WTO ultimately decided that the replacement law violated
U.S. trade obligations. This Note examines the latest decision.
The United States filed a notificationof appeal in response
to the latest WTO decision. This Note concludes by addressing
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issues that the United States must consider in deciding how to
resolve this dispute andpossible solutions to the problem.
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I. INTRODUCTION

For the first time in its history, the United States has statutorily
amended its domestic laws' in an attempt to comply with
international trade obligations.
In addition, the United States
potentially faces sanctions for trade violations that would dwarf any
2
sanctions previously imposed by the World Trade Organization.
3
has complained about U.S.
Although the European Union

1.
Statement By the President:Signing of the "FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial
Income Exclusion Act of 2000," U.S. NEWSWIRE, Nov. 16, 2000.
2.
Joann M. Weiner, Stormy Year for EU Leaders, But Some Tax Progress
Made, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Jan. 2, 2001.
3.
The European Union is comprised of Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal,
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international tax laws for years, the European Union took official
action in 1997 by-filing a complaint against the United States with
the WTO. The European Union claimed that the U.S. foreign sales
corporation (FSC) tax structure was a breach of U.S. obligations
under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCM Agreement) 4 and the Agreement on Agriculture (AA). 5
The European Union challenged the U.S. laws regarding FSC
taxation, claiming that the laws were export-contingent subsidies
that placed the United States in violation of its international trade
obligations. 6 Barbados, Canada, and Japan joined the European
Union in the dispute as third parties to the disagreement. 7 On
October 8, 1999, the WTO dispute settlement panel (DSP) ruled that
the FSC tax regime did not comply with WTO obligations.8 Both the
United States and the European Union challenged certain aspects of
the DSP's findings in the WTO Appellate Body. 9 Canada and Japan
joined the European Union as third parties on appeal.10 On February
24, 2000, the WTO Appellate Body essentially affirmed the DSP
ruling. 1 ' In an attempt to comply with the WTO rulings, President
Bill Clinton signed into law the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial
Income Exclusion Act of 2000 (EIEA or replacement law) on
November 15, 2000.12
After the enactment of the replacement law, the European Union
continued to argue that the replacement law violated international
trade obligations under the SCM Agreement and the AA, and

Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. H.R. REP. NO.106-845, n.1 (2000), available
at 2000 WL 1337578.
World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Tax
4.
Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999), at 62
[hereinafter Report of the Panel].
5.
World Trade Organization, Agreement on Agriculture, cited in Report of
the Panel, supra note 4, at 7.173. The long-term objective of the AA, as stated in its
preamble, is "to establish a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading system ...
initiated through the negotiation of commitments on support and protection and
through the establishment of strengthened and more operationally effective GATT
rules and disciplines." Id.
6.
See generally Report of the Panel, supra note 4.
See generally id. at 253-64.
7.
Id. at 316.
8.
9.
World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, United StatesTax Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/AB[R (Feb. 24, 2000)
[hereinafter Report of the Appellate Body].
10.
Id. at 1.
11.
Id. at 44.
12.
See generally FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-519, 114 Stat. 2423 [hereinafter Replacement Law].
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challenged the replacement law. 13 The European Union again filed a
petition with the WTO challenging the replacement law's compliance
with U.S. trade obligations. On August 20, 2001, the DSP ruled that
14
the replacement law failed to comply with WTO trade obligations.
Additionally, the DSP granted the European Union authorization to
impose over four billion dollars in sanctions against the United States
for past failures to comply with the DSP and Appellate Body
recommendations and continuing violation of international trade
against the United
obligations.' 5 These potential WTO sanctions
16
States are the largest in the WTO's history.
On October 15, 2001, the United States appealed the August 20
WTO decision. Clearly, the outcome of this dispute will have a
significant impact on both the United States and the European Union
because the industries that benefit most from the FSC tax regime are
17
those in which U.S. and EU companies compete most fiercely.
Furthermore, the outcome will affect millions of U.S. jobs,8 in addition
to revenues brought in through taxation and exportation.'
This Note will first explain the WTO's role in international trade
disputes and the procedures that must be followed when filing a
complaint with the WTO. A brief introduction to the WTO is
provided in Part II. Part III depicts the long-standing dispute
between the United States and the European Union regarding the
U.S. tax structure. The different tax structures of the United States
and European Union will also be introduced. Part IV sets forth the
provisions of the original U.S. tax laws regarding FSCs that were
found to be in violation of U.S. trade obligations. Part V presents the
arguments made by the United States and the European Union
regarding the validity of the FSC tax regime. The WTO's holdings
The provisions of the "FSC Repeal and
are then discussed.
Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000," which Congress
enacted in an attempt to comply with the WTO ruling, are set forth in
Part VI. Part VII describes EU criticisms of the replacement law,

World Trade Organization, Request for the Establishment of a Panel,
13.
United States-Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/16 (Dec. 8,
2000) [hereinafter Request for Panel].
World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, United States-Tax
14.
Treatment for "Foreign Sales Corporations," WT/DS108/RW (Aug. 20, 2001)
[hereinafter Second Report of the Panel].
Weiner, supra note 2.
15.
Paul Meller, EU Seeks Sanctions on United States of $4 Billion,
16.
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 18, 2000, at A4.
Id. Major industries benefiting from the FSC tax regime include,
17.
"chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery, electrical equipment, and transportation
equipment." Id.
Gregory Lubkin, FSC Replacement Update: Enacting Extraterritorial
18.
Exclusions, TAX MGM'T INT'L J., Jan. 12, 2001, at 33.
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which resulted in the most recent WTO finding that the replacement
law continues to violate U.S. foreign trade obligations. Finally, Part
VIII discusses the latest U.S. appeal and potential responses.

II.

INTRODUCTION TO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

The WTO was formed in 1995 to ensure that international trade
flows as smoothly and freely as possible, to deal with the global rules
of trade between nations, and to resolve international trade
conflicts.' 9 International trade disputes are resolved through the
WTO's dispute resolution process, where the focus is on
interpretation of agreements and commitments and determination of
how to insure that each country's trade policies comply with the
agreements it has signed. 20 For example, in the dispute between the
United States and the European Union, the WTO will hear the
arguments of both and suggest interpretations of the relevant
The WTO will then determine
international trade agreements.
whether the U.S. tax regime is in compliance with the relevant
agreements. Since the United States and European Union disagree
about the validity of the U.S. FSC tax system, the WTO's role is to
step in, at the request of the European Union, and interpret the
related agreements to which the United States and European Union
are parties.
The WTO's founding members createdthe organization's dispute
settlement scheme to provide an established system and forum for
the mutual resolution of disputes. 21 To achieve this goal, Article 4 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU) dictates that an application to create a
DSP may only be made after consultations between the complaining
party and the party allegedly in violation of its WTO obligations have
22
failed to produce a mutually acceptable resolution.
If consultations or mediations do not produce a solution, the
complaining party may request that a DSP be established to "rule" on
the dispute. 23 Upon receipt of a request from the complaining party,

19.
WTO In Brief, at http://www.wto.org.
20.
Settling Disputes, The WTO's "most individual contribution," at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis_e/tifLe/dispOe.htm. Access to the dispute
Other
settlement system is currently limited to WTO Member Governments.
organizations are not eligible to be WTO Members and therefore are denied formal
participation in the dispute settlement process. Amy Ann Karpel & Terence P.
Stewart, Review of the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Operations of Panels, 31
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 593, 625 (1999).
21.
Id. at 597.
22.
Id.
23.
Id. at 598.
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the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will determine the "terms of
25
reference."2 4 Three persons are then selected to serve on the DSP.
However, panelists cannot be from the nations acting as principal or
Interestingly, unlike the
third parties to the disagreement. 26
standing requirements found in U.S. courts, there is no prerequisite
in the DSU requiring parties to have a legal or economic interest in
the disagreement. The DSPs have also refused to read such a
27
condition into the DSU.

The DSU also permits third parties to participate in panel
disputes. 28 Specifically, Article 10 of the DSU states that "any
Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a panel and
having notified its interest to the DSB .. .shall have an opportunity
to be heard by the panel[, . . .make written submissions to the

panel," and receive submissions of the parties after their first meeting
with the panel.29 Additionally, Article 4 of the DSU provides that a
Member with a substantial interest 30 in an ongoing disagreement
Id. Terms of reference are formalistic statements of the complaint made by
24.
the party in its request for the establishment of a panel. The specificity required of a
party's request for establishment of a panel and the need for identity between the
request for the establishment of a panel and the request for consultations have been
the subjects of much debate among WTO Members. Id. at 614. The DSU merely
instructs Members to indicate in writing "the specific measures at issue and provide a
brief summary of the legal basis of the complaint sufficient to present the problem
clearly." Id.
Id. at 598. Given a "compelling reason," parties to the dispute may object
25.
to the selection of a particular panelist. Id. The DSU states, "panels shall be composed
of well-qualified" individuals with a "sufficiently diverse background and a wide
spectrum of experience." Id. at 609. Concerns regarding the selection of panelists and
the ability of those selected to handle the increasingly complex WTO disputes have
provoked some to ask whether it makes sense to move toward a more permanent
system of panelists, similar to the Appellate Body. Id. at 611. Proponents argue that a
more permanent system would bring greater consistency and experience to panel
decisions. Id. Additionally, it would eliminate the disputes and time delays associated
with objections to the panelists selected. Id.
Id. at 598.
26.
Id. at 620. In EC-Bananas, the European Union contended that the
27.
United States lacked a legal or economic interest in the dispute because it was not an
exporter of bananas and, therefore, lacked standing to bring its claim. The panel and
the Appellate Body rejected this argument, finding that there was not, and should not
be, a legal or economic interest test under the DSU. Id. at 630.
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of
28.
Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, arts. 4 & 10, available at http://wto.org/english/tratep-e/
dispue/dsu.e.htm [hereinafter Understanding on Rules]. There are substantial
differences between the rights of parties and third parties. A third party does not have
the right to appeal panel decisions or to seek compensation and retaliation. Karpel &
Stewart, supra note 20, at 623.
Understanding on Rules, supra note 28, art. 10.
29.
Karpel & Stewart, supra note 20, at 623 (explaining that a Members'
30.
ability to participate in panel disputes as third parties turns on the interpretation of
"substantial interest"). However, no dispute has arisen as to whether a Member has
met the requirements to participate as a third party. Id.

158

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 35:'151

between other Members may request to be joined in consultations.3 1
Once the DSP reviews the parties' arguments and third party
submissions, it will issue an interim decision that sets forth each
party's arguments and presents the panel's verdict.3 2 Parties are
allowed to make comments on the interim report, and the panel then
considers the comments. 33 Final decisions are released first to the
parties and third parties and then to all WTO Members and the
34
public.
Parties may appeal the panel's decision to the Appellate Body
within sixty days of its circulation to the public.3 5 However, the
Appellate Body review is restricted to issues of law and legal
interpretation of the panel.3 6 If a party is found to be in violation of
its international trade obligations, then the complaining party may
37
impose sanctions.

III. BACKGROUND

A. History Behind the ForeignSales CorporationDispute Between the
United States and the European Union
Due to increased global trade and the need of basically every
country to export, national governments feel obligated to maintain a
tax structure that, at the very least, creates a level playing field for
its domestic businesses in the international trading market.3 8 For
years the United States has felt pressure from U.S. businesses to
create and maintain such laws. Domestic businesses pressure the
U.S. government, claiming they are at a disadvantage in the global
trading market.3 9 They also claim that the differing tax philosophies
of the United States and its European trading partners are the
primary reason U.S. businesses are disadvantaged. 40 In response to

31.
Understanding on Rules, supra note 28, art. 4.
32.
Karpel & Stewart, supra note 20, at 599. The interim decision is released
in confidentiality to parties and third parties to a dispute. The process not only allows
the parties a chance to make comments on the decision, but also gives parties a last
chance to settle the dispute before an official decision is issued. Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.
37.
See generally WTO In Brief, supra note 19.
38.
George G. Luscombe & Mark A. Luscombe, The New Extraterritorial
Income Exclusion, ACCT. TODAY, Dec. 18, 2000, at 1011, available at 2000 WL
11748592.
39.
Id.
40.
Id.
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these complaints, the United States has repeatedly attempted to
create a tax structure that provides a level playing field in the
international trading market for U.S. corporations. 41 However, the
European Union has long challenged the United States tax structure,
subsidies,
claiming that the U.S. system provides export-contingent
42
and thereby violates international trade agreements.
The debate between the United States and the European Union
over export-contingent subsidies began as early as 1971 when the
Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) 43 tax regime was
enacted. 44 The European Union condemned the law, claiming it
violated Article XVI of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade
46
(GATT), 45 which prohibits export-related subsidies.
Members of the GATT agreed to prohibit export-contingent
subsides because such subsidies can affect international trade in at
least two ways. 47 First, if a manufacturer can sell subsidized goods
abroad for a lower price than other producers selling similar, but nonsubsidized goods, non-subsidized producers will be deterred from
competing with the subsidized producers. 48 Second, if the subsidized
export product sells in the foreign marketplace at below cost, its
export sales will increase, often to the detriment of other exporters

41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
See Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 60, for the following explanation of

DISC:
A DISC was a domestic subsidiary of a United States company engaged in
exporting, and the DISC regime had very strict qualifying rules requiring that
they participate almost exclusively in export transactions. The income of a
DISC was not taxed directly by the United States, and DISCs were not
required to file tax returns separate from their parent company's tax return.
Instead, DISC income was taxed when it was paid as a dividend to the United
States parent company. Each year, the DISC was deemed to have paid a
portion of its income from export transactions as a dividend to the parent
company, thereby subjecting the parent to taxation on the income. United
States income tax on the remainder of the DISC's income could be deferred
without an interest charge until the income was actually paid to the parent
company (or until certain events occurred).
44.
Phillip L. Jelsma, The Making of a Subsidy, 1984: The Tax and
InternationalTrade Implications of the ForeignSales CorporationLegislation, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1327, 1327 (1986).
45.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. In 1947, the United States along
with many other countries signed the GATT, which attempted to promote free trade
and has became one of the central regulatory institutions for the majority of world
trade issues.
The Multilateral Trading System-past, present and future, at
http://www.wto.org/englishlthewto-e/whatis"_elinbrief-e/inbrOl-e.htm
46.
Jelsma, supranote 44, at 1329.
Id.
47.
Id.
48.
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and domestic manufacturers. 49 The general rule is that any direct or
indirect subsidy that results in the sale of an exported product at a
price lower than that charged for a similar product in the domestic
market violates GATT.
To relieve tension over the legality of DISC, the Reagan
Administration enacted the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Title VIII,
that effectively replaced the DISC with the FSC. 50

In crafting the

FSC, Congress sought to devise a system where it could exempt a
portion of the income from foreign economic processes occurring
outside the United States in order to afford U.S. exporters treatment
comparable to that of Members of the European Union.5 1 Contrary to
underlying intentions, the 1984 legislation only intensified the debate
52
surrounding U.S. export subsidies.
When the WTO was formed in 1995, the SCM Agreement was
54
created 53 and Article XVI of GATT was adopted by the WTO.
Therefore, the disagreement between the United States and
European Union persisted within the newly formed framework of the
WTO. Only two years after the establishment of the WTO, the
European Union took advantage of the WTO dispute resolution
system by initiating an official statement against the FSC tax regime,
55
claiming that it violated the SCM Agreement and the AA.
B.

56
What is a ForeignSales Corporation?

An FSC is a foreign corporation organized outside of the fifty
United States and the District of Columbia 57 that is responsible for
certain sales-related activities in connection with the sale or lease of
goods produced in the United States for export outside the United

49.
Id.
50.
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 62.
51.
Id.
52.
See generally id. Although Congress intended for FSC legislation to be
GATT-consistent and to relieve the conflict between the United States and the
European Union regarding U.S. compliance with international obligations, the new
legislation did not accomplish this goal, as evidenced by the current debate discussed in

this Note. Id.
53.
See generally id.
54.
See generally id.
55.
Id.
56.
There is a distinction between FSCs generally and "small FSCs."
Generally, a small FSC is like an FSC, "except that the tax exemption for a small FSC
is limited to the income generated by $5 million or less in gross export revenues it does
not have to meet foreign management or foreign economic process requirements."
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 41. This Note deals with the typical FSC and does
not discuss "small FSCs."
57.
Id. at 40.
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States. 58 An FSC must be created in an eligible U.S. possession, 59 or
"under the laws of a country that either has a bilateral or multilateral
exchange of information agreement with the United States or has
entered into an income tax treaty with the United States that permits
the exchange of information."60 The eligible corporation must file a
timely election to be taxed as an FSC during the ninety-day period
61
immediately before the beginning of its taxable year.
A corporation must fulfill several requirements to qualify as an
FSC. An FSC may not have more than twenty-five shareholders at
62
any time during the taxable year and may not issue preferred stock.
The FSC must also keep a set of permanent records at an office
outside the United States and a duplicate set within the United
63
States.
An FSC must have a board of directors that includes at least one
person who is not a resident of the United States.6 4 FSC meetings
between the board of directors and shareholders must take place
outside the United States.65 However, this requirement is usually
not difficult to meet, as holding meetings over the telephone can
easily satisfy foreign management requirements. Additionally, the
corporation can use service companies in its country of incorporation
to deal with paperwork.6 6 That is, activities may be subcontracted,
and the subcontractor is not necessarily required to have a direct
contract with the FSC. Moreover, an FSC's primary bank account
must be in a qualifying foreign country, and all dividends, legal and
fees are required to
accounting fees, salaries of officers, and director's
67
be distributed from the foreign bank account.
The FSC, or its agent, must take part in the sales process outside
of the United States, including soliciting, negotiating, and

58.
Id.
There are four eligible United States possessions--American Samoa, the
59.
Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the
United States. Charles Bruce et al., Portfolio 934-1st: Foreign Sales Corporations,TAX
MGMT. PORTFOLIOS (BNA), II.B.2 (2001) [hereinafter Portfolio 934-1st].
60.
Jelsma, supra note 44, at 1338; see I.R.C. § 274 (h)(6)(C) (Supp. 1985). A
list of twenty-four qualifying foreign jurisdictions has been published. The countries
listed are: Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bermuda, Cyprus, Denmark, Egypt,
Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Korea, Malta, Morocco, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sweden, and the
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. Portfolio-934-1st, supra note 59, at II.B.2.
61.
Jelsma, supra note 44, at 1340.
Id. at 1339.
62.
63.
Id. at 1339-40.
64.
Id. at 1340.
65.
Portfolio 934-1st, supra note 59, at IV.B.
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 41.
66.
Portfolio 934-1st, supra note 59, at IV.B.2.
67.
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contracting.6 8 , Also, the FSC must have a minimum percentage of
direct foreign costs, 6 9 which include "advertising and sales promotion,
processing customer orders, arranging for delivery of the export
property, transportation, assembling and transmission of a final
invoice or statement of accounting the receipt of payment, and
' 70
assumption of credit risk.
Most often, a U.S. corporation that produces goods in the United
States owns an FSC. 71 The U.S. corporation may provide goods to the
FSC for resale abroad or pay the FSC a commission in connection
with such sales. 72 There is no statutory obligation that an FSC be
associated with or controlled by a U.S. corporation; 73 however, the
FSC tax regime is set up such that the benefit to both FSCs and the
U.S. corporations will usually be greater if the supplier is associated
with the FSC. 74 Consequently, many FSCs are controlled foreign
subsidiaries of the U.S. corporations. 75 Over seventy major U.S.
corporations benefit from the FSC tax system,7 6 including: 3M,
Cargill, Boeing, Microsoft, Duke Energy Corporation, Eli Lilly,
Eastman Kodak, Exxon Mobil, Lockheed Martin, General Motors,
79
78
General Electric, 77 Motorola, and the Walt Disney Company.
Although oversimplified, the benefit for the FSC itself amounts
to an exemption of a portion of its export profits.8 0 In other words,
the income of an eligible FSC is partially subject to U.S. tax and
partially exempt from U.S. tax. 8 1 For the related supplier-the
exporter-generally the FSC's corporate shareholder, "a full
dividends-received deduction for earnings and profits distributed out

68.
69.

Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 40.
Id. at 41.

70.

Id.

71.
72.

Id. at 40.
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 3.

73.

Id.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.

76.
Les Blumenthal, WTO Ruling Targets U.S. Tax Breaks for Exporters Trade:
Boeing, Microsoft Among Companies that WTO Saw Are Receiving Billions in Illegal
Subsidies, NEwS TRIB., Aug. 26, 2001, at D1.
U.S. Trade Policy Suffers a Blow As WTO Rules Against Tax Break,
77.
SEATTLE POST INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 21, 2001, at Al [hereinafter U.S. Trade Policy
Suffers]. According to the European Union website, from 1991 to 1998, General
Electric saved $746 million under the FSC tax scheme. Id.
78.
Id. According to the European Union's website, from 1991 to 1998,
Motorola saved $378 million under the FSC tax scheme. Id.
79.
Blumenthal, supra note 76, at D1.
80.
Portfolio 943-1st, supra note 59, at III.A.
81.
H.R. REP. No. 106-1004, at 170 (2000), available at 2000 WL 1623047; see
infra notes 120-30 and accompanying text (discussing what part of an FSC's income
qualifies for an exemption from U.S. taxation).
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of foreign trade income8 2 is available, so that the exempt portion of
the FSC's foreign trade income is not taxed to the exporter and the
83
taxable portion is not double-taxed in the hands of the exporter.
Thus, a U.S. corporation benefits from setting up an FSC to which it
can allocate certain income and thereby reduce its overall taxation.
C. Tax Systems
The United States and countries within the European Union
have fundamentally different tax frameworks. 84 These different
systems help fuel the long-standing debate over subsidies and the
taxation of exports. Both the United States and the European Union
argue that the other side misunderstands the other's tax structure,
which gives rise to many issues within the tax dispute.8 5
Essentially, there are two basic types of income tax systems: (1)
a residence-based--or worldwide-system, which has been adopted by
the United States, and (2) a territorial system, which has been
implemented by countries in the European Union. 86 In practice,
however, neither the United States nor the Member States of the
European Union employ a "pure" system;87 most countries employ

See infra note 121 and accompanying text.
82.
83.
Portfolio 934-1st, supra note 59, at 1II.A.
Michael Graetz, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture, Taxing International
84.
Income: Inadequate Principles,Outdated Concepts and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX
L. REV. 261, 271-75 (2001). There has been a long-standing debate regarding which tax
structure/philosophies are most beneficial. Underlying the debate are three main
competing tax theories. "Capital export neutrality" ("CEN") supports the idea that the
exporting company should be subject to the same level of worldwide tax as its domestic
U.S. rivals. Id. at 271. CEN "is neutral about a resident's choice between domestic and
foreign investments providing the same pretax rates of return." Id. at 270. CEN is the
philosophy adopted by those countries implementing the worldwide tax system. Id. at
271. A second theory, "capital import neutrality" ("CIN"), supports export companies
paying the same level of worldwide tax as foreign rivals. Id. CIN requires all
investments "in a given country pay the same marginal rate of income taxation
regardless of the residence of the investor." Id. at 270. CIN "subjects all business
activity within a specified country to the same overall level of taxation," whether a
resident or a foreigner conducts the activity. Id. at 271. The CIN theory is the
philosophy that has been adopted by those countries implementing the territorial tax
system. The third tax theory is "national neutrality" ("NN'). Id. at 274. This theory
"seeks neutrality between the pretax return on domestic investments and the return on
foreign investments after the payment of foreign taxes." Id. NN "regards domestic
investments as preferable to foreign investment." Id. Under this theory, foreign taxes
are treated "the same as domestic costs of doing business and [are allowed] only a
deduction for foreign income taxes." Id. Although NN is a recognized theory, it has
been "routinely dismissed as unwise and unrealistic." Id. at 275.
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 6.
85.
86.
H.R. REP. No. 106-845, at 15.
87.
Id.
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some combination of the two concepts. 88 Both systems are intended
to avoid double taxation of income.8 9
Each country is permitted to develop its own unique tax
structure because there are no rules of international law requiring
nations to conform to a single tax system. 90
Each country is
encouraged to implement the tax system of its choice, so long as the
provisions of the tax regime do not breach any international trade
agreements. 91 WTO Members agree that it has never been the
WTO's intent to establish international tax "norms. '92 The freedom
each country has to establish a distinctive tax structure is beneficial
because it allows each country to create tax laws that promote that
country's objectives. It complicates the drafting of tax laws, however,
because each country wants its corporations to be on a "level playing
field" in the international market, while simultaneously maximizing
its own tax revenue.
1. World-Wide System Currently in Place in the United States
The U.S. tax regime, although not a pure system, is regarded as
a worldwide system of taxation. 93 Under a worldwide system, all of
the income earned by a resident 94 is subject to tax, regardless of
where that income is earned. 95 Thus, U.S. residents begin with the
premise that all their worldwide income is subject to tax. U.S.
residents must then look for specific provisions within the Internal
96
Revenue Code (I.R.C.) for exceptions to this general rule.

88.
Id.
89.
"Double taxation arises when the same income of the same taxpayer is
subjected to comparable taxes both in the source country and in the country of
residence for identical periods." Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 37. If a United
States corporation has an entity abroad and that entity's income was taxed both in the
country in which it was earned, under the territorial system, and by the United States,
because the corporation is a resident and therefore taxable under the worldwide
system, that corporation would have been subject to double taxation. Id.
90.
Id. at 59.
91.
Id.
92.
Id. at 60.
93.
The United States employs an aggressive, hybrid system. H.R. REP. No.
106-845, at 15.
94.
A corporation formed under the laws of one of the fifty Unites States or the
District of Columbia is a "domestic" corporation and is "resident" in the United States
for purposes of the worldwide taxation system. Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at
36.
95.
Id. at 58.
96.
Generally, in order not to be taxed on worldwide income, U.S. residents
must look for one of the many ways in which the I.R.C. provides for relief from
taxation. A discussion of the specific ways to avoid taxation on worldwide income is
beyond the scope of this Note. See generally I.R.C.
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A worldwide system generally avoids double taxation by granting
foreign tax credits. 97 When income is earned abroad and taxed by a
foreign government, a tax credit is provided to U.S. corporations to
98
avoid double taxation.
In addition to residents, the United States also taxes any income
earned by foreign corporations within the United States.9 9 Under
U.S. tax law, all corporations that are not incorporated in one of the
fifty states or the District of Columbia are considered foreign
corporations. 10 0 The United States generally does not tax income
that is earned by foreign corporations outside the United States.
However, foreign-source 01' income of a foreign corporation generally
will be subject to U.S. taxation when such income is "effectively
connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United
U.S. tax laws and regulations provide for the tax
States."'10 2
a
authorities to conduct a factual inquiry to determine whether
'10 3
foreign corporation's income is "effectively connected income.
Alone among the large economies, the United States relies
largely on the income tax for its national revenue base. 0 4 Arguably,
the U.S. tax system collects more money than any other tax system in
the world and at the lowest cost of any system. 10 5 The United States
favors the worldwide system because it is perceived to be fairer for
income taxes to be based on the taxpayer's ability to pay rather than
on the source of income. 10 6
2. Territorial System Currently in Place Within the European Union
Most countries within the European Union operate under a
hybrid tax system; however, the tax system in those countries is
closer to a territorial system than a worldwide system. l0 7 Under a
territorial system, only income earned within the borders of the
taxing jurisdiction is subject to tax.10 8 Thus, a resident of a country
within the European Union can earn income from sources outside his

97.
98.
99.
tax system

H.R. REP. No. 106-845, at 15.
Id.
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 3-4. This element of the U.S.
looks more like that of a territorial system.

100.

Id. at 4.

101.
102.

Foreign source income is income earned outside the United States. Id.
Id.

103.

Id.

Paul Stephan, Sheriff or Prisoner? The United States and the World Trade
104.
Organization,1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 49, 61 (2000).
105.
Robert J. Peroni, Back to the Future: A Path to Progressive Reform of the
United States InternationalIncome Tax Rules, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 975 (1997).
Id. at 980.
106.
H.R. REP. No. 106-845, at 15.
107.
108.
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 59.
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home country and will not be taxed on that income, regardless of
whether the entity earning the income is a resident of the country or
not. To avoid double taxation, the territorial system grants a general
exemption-income earned abroad is simply not subject to tax. 10 9
This leads to problems for U.S. businesses because a European
business could set up an operation in a low tax jurisdiction and
reduce its overall taxes, while a U.S. business doing the same could
not reduce its overall taxes. 110

IV.

THE FORMER

U.S.

FOREIGN SALES CORPORATION TAX REGIME

A. Overview
To understand where the tax dispute currently stands and the
options the United States faces, it is first necessary to understand the
FSC tax regime that the European Union challenged in 1997. The
general assumption under the U.S. worldwide tax system is that the
United States has the right to tax all income earned worldwide by its
citizens and residents, including all foreign source income. 1 Thus, a
U.S. corporation benefits from setting up an FSC to which it can
allocate certain income and thereby reduce its overall tax burden.
Under the former FSC tax regime, although an FSC is a foreign
corporation, 112 and therefore not a U.S. resident, the United States
asserted its taxing jurisdiction over the foreign corporation through
the corporation's election to become an FSC.1 1 3 Therefore, the FSC
was treated as if it engaged in a U.S. trade or business and its income
was effectively connected thereto. 1 14 The FSC tax regime functioned,
however, as an exception to the general rule that worldwide income of
United States citizens, residents, and corporations would be taxed by
5
the United States."
In essence, U.S. taxpayers using an FSC received a partial
exemption from U.S. taxes for export profits. 116 A portion of an FSC's
export profits was allocated to the FSC. A percentage of that amount

109.
Id.
110.
Luscombe & Luscombe, supra note 38, at 2.
111.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
112.
See supra note 94 and accompanying text (explaining that a corporation is
domestic if it is created under the laws of the fifty United States or the District of
Columbia).
113.
Jelsma, supra note 44, at 1340.
114.
Portfolio 934-1st, supra note 59, at 41.
115.
Id.
116.
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 45.
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was then treated as tax exempt in the hands of the FSC. 117 The other
portion was taxable to the FSC. l" 8 However, dividends paid by the
FSC out of exempt or nonexempt income to the shareholder-usually
the related supplier/exporter-normally were eligible for a full
dividends-received deduction, on the condition that the recipient was
a corporation. 119
The foreign-source income of an FSC was divided into foreign
An FSC's
trade income and all other foreign-source income. 120
foreign trade income was defined as its foreign trading gross receipts
generated in qualifying transactions. 12 1 In the context of the FSC tax
regime, foreign trading gross receipts were generally gross receipts of
the FSC from the "sale, exchange, or other disposition of export
122
property."'
Only certain transactions qualified for such treatment.
Qualifying transactions involved the sale or lease of export property
or the performance of services "related and subsidiary" to such sale or
lease.' 2 3 Therefore, to qualify as having tax-exempt income, export
property must have been involved in the transaction. 124 Export
property was defined as property manufactured or produced 12 5 in the
United States 12 6 by a person other than an FSC, sold or leased by or
to an FSC for use, consumption, or disposition outside the United
States, 2 7 and of which no more than fifty percent of its fair market

117.

Id. at 43.

118.
Id.
Id.
119.
Portfolio 934-1st, supra note 59, at 41.
120.
121.
Report of Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 4.
122.
Portfolio 934-1st, supra note 59, at 41.
123.
Report of Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 4.
Id.
124.
Portfolio 934-1st, supra note 59, at 45. Purchased property is considered
125.
manufactured or produced only if it is substantially transformed prior to sale. For
example, in Revised Rule 73-279, 1973-1 C.B. 363, the IRS ruled that the dismantling
of old railroad cars, the shearing and baling of scrap metal, and the cutting of old
railroad rail constituted substantial transformation. Id.
126.
The definition includes the fifty states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto
Rico, all within United Stated customs territory. Portfolio 934-1st, supra note 59, at
45.
127.
Id. at 46-47.
[T]he destination test will be considered satisfied if the seller or lessor delivers
the property: (i) Within the United States to a carrier or freight forwarder for
ultimate delivery outside the United States to a purchaser or lessee; (ii) Within
the United States to a purchaser or lessee, if the property is ultimately
delivered outside the United States by the purchaser or lessee within one year
after the sale or lease; (iii) Within or outside the United States to a purchaser
or lessee which, at the time of the sale or lease, is an FSC or an interest charge
DISC and is not a member of the same controlled group as the seller or lessor;
(iv) From the United States to the purchaser or lessee at a point outside the
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value is attributable to imports. 128 Export property was also property
designated by the President to be in short supply. 129 In other words,
to have potentially tax-exempt income, an FSC must have been
involved in the sale, lease, or exchange of products at least partially
produced in the United States and which were being sold for final use
outside the United States. 13 0
B. Alternatives and Exemptions Provided to ForeignSales
CorporationsFrom Generally Applicable United States Tax Rules
An FSC benefited from this tax structure because the system
established either alternatives or exemptions from generally
applicable U.S. tax laws that affected the U.S. tax liability of the FSC
and its U.S. supplier/exporter. 13 1 First, the FSC tax regime created
alternative transfer-pricing rules for FSCs. 13 2 The transfer pricing
rules were used to allocate the income from transactions involving
U.S. export property between the FSC and its U.S. exporter. 133 Also,
the transfer pricing rules were used to determine how much of the
income-from transactions involving U.S. export property that is
allocated to the FSC as foreign trade income-was exempt foreign
13 4
trade income.
The generally applicable rule the United States developed for
dealing with transfer pricing between associated enterprises was set
13 6
13 5
The rule required arm's-length pricing
out in Section 482 of the I.R.C.

United States by means of the seller's or lessor's own ship, aircraft, or other
delivery vehicle, owned, leased, or chartered by the seller or lessor; (v) Outside
the United States to a purchaser or lessee from a warehouse, storage, facility,
or assembly site located outside the United States, if the property was
previously shipped by the seller or lessor from the United States; or (vi)
Outside the United States to a purchaser or lessee if the property was
previously shipped by the seller or lessor from the United States and if the
property is located outside the United States pursuant to a prior lease [that
was terminated at the conclusion of its term].
Id.
128.
Report of Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 4.
S. REP. No. 106-416, at 4 (2000).
129.
See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
130.
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 4.
131.
132.
Id.
Id.
133.
Id.
134.
See generally I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
135.
The definition is flexible and is typically based on the latest interpretation
136.
of arm's-length principle as out by the OECD's "Transfer Pricing Guidelines for
The
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations" ("the Guidelines").
Guidelines are a result of an internal consensus that rules must be established to deal
with transfer pricing occurring from one jurisdiction to another. Report of the Panel,
supra note 4, at 45.
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between the relevant enterprises. 37 Any alternative transfer pricing
methods used were subject to Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
inquiries to ensure the arm's-length pricing Irequirement was
38
upheld.'
Contrary to the general transfer-pricing rule set forth for nonFSCs, under the FSC scheme an FSC could choose to apply one of
three transfer-pricing rules to calculate its foreign trade income from
qualifying transactions. 39 Therefore, an FSC's taxable income from
an export transaction may have been determined on the basis of one
of two administrative pricing rules 140 or the generally applicable
rule.141
One alternative transfer-pricing rule an FSC could choose to
apply apportioned twenty-three percent of the total combined taxable
income-net income earned by the related supplier and the FSC
together-derived from the sale of export property to the FSC and the
remaining seventy-seven percent to its related supplier. 142 This rule
further provided that approximately sixty-five percent of the FSC's
foreign trade income was exempt from U.S. tax. 143 Thus, this rule
provided an exemption for fifteen percent (23% x 15/23) of the total
combined taxable income earned in the transaction.1 44
This
exemption unmistakably conferred a benefit to FSCs by significantly
reducing the amount of taxes owed to the U.S. government.
The second administrative pricing rule an FSC could choose to
implement allowed the FSC to take 1.83% of its total foreign trading
gross receipts from the sale of export property as foreign trade
income, not to exceed twice the amount allocable to the FSC under
the combined taxable income method, that is forty-six percent of the
total combined net income earned in FSC transactions. 145 This rule
further provided that approximately sixty-five percent (15/23) of the
FSC's foreign trade income was exempt from U.S. tax. 146 Thus, this
rule provided an exemption for up to thirty percent (46% x 15/23) of
1 47
the total combined taxable income earned in the transaction.
However, the thirty percent exemption was only available in limited
circumstances. 48 If applicable, the reduction in taxes owed under

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
I.R.C. § 925 (1986).
Id.
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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this second alternative pricing rule created a considerable advantage
to an FSC by decreasing the taxes it owed the U.S. government.
The significance of allowing an FSC to use the alternative
administrative pricing rules was that the alternative rules allowed
FSCs to choose which transfer pricing rule to implement in a
particular transaction. 149
Moreover, these alternative transfer
pricing rules could be implemented without requiring government
inquiry as to whether the FSC was conducting itself in an arm'slength fashion. 150
In addition to alternative transfer-pricing rules, an FSC
benefited from the FSC tax structure because the system established
151
three main exemptions from generally applicable U.S. tax laws.
First, under U.S. law generally, the foreign-source income of a foreign
corporation engaged in a trade or business in the United States is
only taxable to the extent that it is "effectively connected with the
152
conduct of a trade or business within the United States."'
Normally, to determine whether the foreign-source income of a
foreign corporation is effectively connected, a factual inquiry would be
undertaken by tax authorities. 153 However, under the FSC tax
structure, the exempt portion of an FSC's foreign trade income was
"treated as foreign source income which is not effectively connected
1 54
with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States.'
In other words, the exempt portion of the FSC's foreign trade income
was not subject to a factual inquiry to determine if it was effectively
connected. 155
Therefore, income that met the established

Because the ceiling for the gross receipts method is linked to the combined
taxable [net] income method, it is not mathematically possible to receive the
full 30 percent exemption unless the profit margin on a transaction is 4 percent
or less. At a profit margin of 8 percent or more, the exemption amount under
the gross receipts method will be no more than 15 percent under any
circumstances.

Id.
149. Actually, there is even a redetermination rule in which an FSC and its
related supplier may make a redetermination of the transfer price to the FSC on a
transaction if they determine that a different transfer pricing method is more
advantageous. This redetermination may be made up to the time of an audit. Portfolio
934-1st, supra note 59, at V.A.2.c.
150.
It should be noted that § 482 allows for alternative methods to be employed,
but the alternatives are subject to approval by United States tax authorities (the IRS),
conditioned on arm's length dealing, and is not at the taxpayer's free choice. Report of
the Panel, supra note 4, at 46.
151.
Id. at 45.
152.
Report of Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 4.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
Id.
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requirements set out for FSCs was automatically deemed not to be
effectively connected.156
Second, under U.S. law generally, a shareholder in a controlled
foreign corporation 57 must include in his gross income each year a
pro rata share of certain types of income 15 8 of the foreign controlled
corporation even though such income has not yet been distributed to
the U.S. parent. 159 This income is known as Subpart F income. 160
The effect of Subpart F is that U.S. parent corporations are
immediately subject to U.S. taxation on such imputed income even
161
though the income remains in the foreign subsidiary's control.
However, under the FSC tax regime, an FSC was generally exempt
from Subpart F income. 162 The parent of an FSC was not required to
declare its pro rata share of the undistributed income of an FSC that
was derived from the FSC's foreign trade income.
Third, under U.S. law generally, dividends received by a U.S.
corporation that were derived from the foreign-source income of a
foreign corporation, were taxable, unless such income has already
been taxed under the Subpart F rules. 163 U.S. corporate shareholders
of an FSC, however, generally could have deducted one hundred
percent of dividends received from distributions made out of the
foreign trade income of an FSC. 164 Therefore, the U.S. corporate
shareholder benefited by setting up an FSC because it could avoid
U.S. taxation on dividends received from the FSC.
According to the European Union, the underlying problem was
that in order to qualify for these alternatives and exemptions, a
business had to be an FSC, and in order for an FSC's income to
qualify for the exemptions, it had to be involved in transactions
165
dealing with U.S. exports.

Id.
156.
157.
I.R.C. § 957 (1986). A "controlled foreign corporation" is any corporation
where more then 50% of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock of such
corporation entitled to vote, or the total value of the stock of such corporation is owned
or considered owned by U.S. shareholders on any day during the taxable year of such
foreign corporation. Id.
158.
I.R.C. §§ 952, 954 (1986). Subpart F income rules are only applicable when
dealing with certain types of income. For example, a CFC engaged in manufacturing
would not be subject to the deemed divided rules. Id.
Report of Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 5.
159.
Id.
160.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.
Id.
164.
165.
See generally Report of the Panel, supra note 4; Report of the Appellate
Body, supra note 9.
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V. THE FINDINGS OF THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

16 6

A. The Decision of the Dispute Settlement Panel

The European Union alleged that the U.S. FSC tax regime
conferred subsidies that were export-contingent in violation of
international trade obligations under the SCM Agreement and the
AA. 167
The European Union set forth several issues in its
complaint. 168
First, the DSP had to determine whether FSC
measures were subsidies contingent upon export performance within
the meaning of Articles 1 and 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. 16 9 Next,
the DSP was asked to decide whether the FSC tax regime created
subsidies that were contingent upon the use of domestic over
imported goods within the meaning of Article 3.1(b) of the SCM
171
Agreement. 170 The DSP, however, declined to consider this issue.
Finally, the DSP had to determine whether FSC measures violated
Articles 3.3 and 8 of the AA.172
1. Is the Foreign Sales Corporation Tax Regime an ExportContingent Subsidy?
a. Establishment of the "But For" Test
The panel's first goal was to determine whether the FSC system
created subsidies. 173 The panel looked to the SCM Agreement for the
definition of a subsidy. 174 According to Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM
Agreement:
For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist
if: (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public

166.
See generally Report of the Panel, supra note 4.
167.
Both the European Union and the United States argued that the other had
not complied with procedural requirement under the SCM Agreement and the AA.
However, since these arguments do not go to the substantive problem of the FSC tax
regime and were not considered in drafting the replacement law, they are not discussed
in this Note. Id.
168.
See generally id.
169.

Id.

170.
171.

Id.
Id.

172.
173.

Id.

174.

Id. at 36.
Id. at 278-79.

20021

FOREIGN SALES CORPORATIONS
body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as
"government!) where: ...(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due
is foregone or not collected and... (b) a benefit is thereby conferred.

1 75

However, this definition did not clarify the debate as to whether
the FSC tax regime was a subsidy offered by the United States. The
European Union averred that the exemptions and alternatives offered
to FSCs from the generally applicable laws through the FSC tax
regime constituted subsidies within the meaning of Article 1 of the
benchmark
SCM Agreement. 176 The parties disagreed about what
177
should be used to determine what was "otherwise due."
The European Union claimed that the FSC scheme involved two
subsidies. 178 First, the European Union asserted that the three
exemptions 79 from income taxes for FSCs and their parent
companies created subsidies. 180 The European Union also claimed
that the FSC transfer-pricing rules, 18 1 which were distinguishable
from normal U.S. transfer-pricing rules, 8 2 created subsidies.
Arguing that these were subsidies because FSCs were exempt from
generally applicable laws, the European Union reasoned that if the
FSCs had not been exempt from the generally applicable laws
through the FSC tax regime, the United States would have collected
from at least some of these foreign corporations.' 8 3 Therefore, the
United States was foregoing revenue that was "otherwise due."
The United States responded that the FSC transfer pricing rules
and the FSC tax exemptions did not amount to a subsidy under
Article 1 of the SCM agreement.' 8 4 A crucial part of the U.S. defense
was footnote 59 of the Illustrative List.' 8 5 Although the Illustrative
List, Item (e), identifies as an export subsidy "the full or partial
exemption, remission, or deferral specifically related to exports, of
direct taxes," the United States pointed to footnote 59 which states:
The Members recognize that deferral need not amount to an export
subsidy where, for example, appropriate interest charges are collected.
The Members reaffirm the principle that prices for goods in
transactions between exporting enterprises and foreign buyers under
their or under the same control should for tax purposes be the prices

175.
Id.
176.
Id. at 277.
177.
Id. at 269-84.
178.
Id. at 277.
179.
Id.
180.
Id.
181.
Id.; I.R.C. § 925 (1986).
182.
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 277; I.R.C. § 482 (1986).
183.
The United States would have collected taxes from at least some of the
foreign businesses that elected to become FSCs based on the "effectively connected"
analysis. Report of Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 4.
184.
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 277.
185.
Id.
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which would be charged between independent enterprises acting at
arm's-length .... 186

The United States interpreted footnote 59 to mean that income
generated from foreign economic processes need not be taxed, and
that the exemptions of some or all of such income, by whatever
means, is not a prohibited export subsidy.' 8 7 The United States
argued that the arm's-length principle in footnote 59 would be
irrelevant if income from foreign economic processes was not allowed
to be exempt from direct taxes.18 8 The main thrust of the U.S.
defense rested on the 1981 interpretation of tax rules as subsidies,
which the United States maintained found its way into the SCM
through footnote 59.189

The basic difference in arguments between the United States
and European Union, which led to the conflicting results, is the order
in which provision are to be considered. 9 0 The European Union
began it analysis with Articles 1 and 3 of the SCM Agreement, and
then proceeded to the Illustrative List as confirmation for its
began its
conclusions. 191 On the other hand, the United States 192
analysis with footnote 59 of Item (e) of the Illustrative List.
The panel interpreted the foregoing of revenue otherwise due to
mean that less revenue had been raised by the government than
would have been raised in a different situation. 193 According to the
panel the word "foregone" suggested, "The government has given up
an entitlement to raise revenue that it could 'otherwise' have
94
raised."1
The panel clarified that this is not entitlement in the abstract,
because in theory, governments could tax all revenues. 195 Therefore,
the term "otherwise due" implies a comparison between the revenues
due under the contested measure and revenues that would be due in
another situation. 196 In other words, the panel looked at what
revenues the United States was entitled to collect under its current
tax system "but for" the FSC tax regime. 197 When analyzed in this
manner, the U.S. tax structure was used as the benchmark for

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at 293.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 293.
Id. at 281-85.
Id. at 291-94.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 279.
Id. at 280.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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determining what was otherwise due. 198 The panel stated that a
Member that decides that it will tax income arising from foreign
economic activities foregoes revenue otherwise due if it decides in a
selective manner to exclude certain limited categories of such income
from taxation. 199
b. Does the Foreign Sales Corporation Tax Regime Pass the "But
For" Test?
Using the "but for" test, the panel considered whether the tax
exemptions provided to FSCs under the FSC tax system amounted to
the "foregoing of revenue that was otherwise due. ' 200 The European
Union first argued that the rules provided to determine whether the
income of an FSC was "effectively connected with the conduct of a
trade or business within the United States" exempts from taxation
certain income of an FSC which, in the case of a non-FSC, the United
States would treat as taxable. 20 1 Under the generally applicable
rules, an evaluation is to be conducted to determine whether foreign
income is "effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or
business in the United States." 20 2 However, the FSC tax regime
automatically treated an FSC's foreign trade income as not effectively
connected to a U.S. business and therefore not taxable. 20 3 Thus, "but
for" the FSC tax scheme, the United States might have collected
revenue from these foreign corporations upon determining that the
business was effectively connected to a U.S. business. The European Union next pointed out that foreign trade income
20 4
of an FSC was exempt from the requirements of Subpart F.
Therefore, the parent of an FSC did not need to report as income
undistributed income from the FSC that would otherwise have been
subject to immediate taxation under Subpart F, "but for" the FSC tax
regime. 20 5 Therefore, the United States was not collecting revenue

198.
199.

Id.
Id. at 294. Additionally, the panel stated:

[A]ssuming for the sake of argument that footnote 59 is predicated on the
assumption that income arising from foreign economic processes is not as a
general matter "otherwise due" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii), we
could at most conclude that a decision by a Member not to tax any income
arising from foreign economic processes would not represent the foregoing of
revenue "otherwise due."

Id.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

Id. at 295.
Id.
Report of the Appellate Body, supra note 9, at 4.
I.R.C. § 921(a) (1986).
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 296.
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that was otherwise due because certain FSC income was exempt from
Subpart F requirements.
Finally, the European Union claimed that the parent of an FSC
need not pay income taxes on income distributed to it and
attributable to the foreign trade income of an FSC that would
otherwise be fully taxable at the time the income was distributed "but
for" the FSC tax system. 20 6 Therefore, the United States was not
collecting revenue it would collect if the FSC tax regime were not in
place.
The panel found all three exemptions to be foregone revenue
20 7
otherwise due; therefore, each exemption constituted a subsidy.
The panel stated, "Applying the 'but for' test to the FSC scheme,
there can be no doubt that, in the absence of the FSC scheme, income
which is shielded from taxation by that scheme would be subject to
taxation. '20 8 Once the panel established the "but for" test to apply to
209
the exemptions, the United States did not dispute the conclusion.
Additionally, the panel found that the financial contributions
clearly conferred a benefit, which is a requirement under Article 1 of
the SCM Agreement, because it relieved both the FSC and its parent
from having to pay taxes that were otherwise due. 210 Moreover, that
benefit was found to be substantial because the tax exemption could
be as much as fifteen to thirty percent of gross income from
211
exporting.
c. Are the Foreign Sales Corporation Exemptions Export-Contingent?
Determining whether the FSC tax regime enabled the United
States to create a subsidy was only the first step in the panel's
analysis, because subsidies alone are not a violation of the SCM
Agreement. 2 12 Although the panel found the FSC exemptions to be
subsidies within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(ii), in order to be a
violation of the SCM Agreement the subsidies must also be exportcontingent within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM
Agreement. 2 13
Article 3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement, entitled
"Prohibitions," states in pertinent part: "[E]xcept as provided in the
Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the
meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited: (a) subsidies contingent, in

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
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Id. at 196.
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law or in fact, whether solely or as one of several other conditions,
upon export performance.. ."214
The panel found that the FSC exemptions were in fact exportcontingent, and therefore, a breach of U.S. obligations under the SCM
Agreement. 2 15 A subsidy, the panel reasoned, was only available
with respect to foreign trading income. 216 "Foreign trading income" is
2 17
that income which arose from the sale or lease of export property.
"Export property" was limited in effect to goods manufactured,
produced, grown, or extracted in the United States that were held for
2 18
direct use, consumption, or disposition outside the United States.
Therefore, the subsidy could only be granted to income involved in
transactions dealing with U.S. export property. 219 The panel easily
220
found that such a subsidy was export-contingent.
The United States argued that the WTO was penalizing a
country using a worldwide system for incorporating elements of a
territorial system in order to obtain comparable tax treatment for its
exporters. 22 1 The WTO responded that the United States was free to
maintain a worldwide system, a territorial tax system, or any other
type of system it saw fit. 222 However, the panel stated that that did
not mean that,
The United States is free to establish a regime of direct taxation,
provide an exemption from direct taxes specifically related to exports,
and then claim that it is entitled to provide such an export subsidy
because it is necessary to eliminate a disadvantage to exporters created
223
by the U.S. tax system itself.

The panel declined to rule on the validity of the FSC transfer-pricing
22 4
rules.
2. Does the Foreign Sales Corporation Scheme Violate Article 3.3 of
the Agreement on Agriculture?
The European Union asserted that the FSC tax system violated
Article 3.3 of the AA. 225 A violation of Article 3.3 of the AA may be
found to exist upon the determination that (a) a Member is providing
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216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
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224.
225.
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Id. at 228-32.
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"export subsidies listed in paragraph I of Article 9 of that
Agreement;" and (b) in respect of a scheduled product, that those
export subsidies are being provided in excess of the budgetary outlay
and/or quantity commitment levels specified in its Schedule, or in
respect of an unscheduled product, 22 6 that it is providing any such
subsidies. 227 Therefore, with respect to agricultural products in
which a Member has specific export subsidy commitments, "scheduled
agricultural products," 228 a violation of Article 3.3 can only arise if
22 9
the Member provided subsidies in excess of the commitment level.
However,
regarding unscheduled
agricultural products,
an
inconsistency under Article 3.3 would arise if a Member provided any
23 0
subsidy.
For Article 3.3 of the AA to be violated, section 9.1(d) had to be
satisfied.2 31 Thus, to determine whether there was a violation of
Article 3.3 of the AA, the panel first had to decide whether the
subsidy was listed in paragraph 1 of Article 9.232 For the FSC scheme
to fall within the scope of Article 9.1(d), two criteria had to be
satisfied. First, there must have been a subsidy.2 33 Second, the
subsidy must have been given to reduce the costs of marketing
2 34
exports of agricultural products.
23 5
The panel had already determined that a subsidy existed.
Thus, the panel only had to determine whether the subsidy provided
by the FSC tax scheme was provided to "reduce the costs of
marketing agricultural exports. '236 The European Union argued that
by reducing the tax liability arising out of foreign sales, the FSC
scheme reduced the costs of marketing exports.23 7 The European
Union reasoned that the FSC scheme reduced the costs of marketing
exports, since marketing means advertising, sales promotion, and
solicitation, and these are all activities for which the FSC is

226.
Id. at 307.
227.
Id. at 310.
228.
Generally, scheduled agricultural products are those to which the Member
(in this case the United States) provides subsidies but has committed to reduce the
level of subsidies offered for the particular product. Under the Uruguay Round,
Members of the WTO committed to reduce subsidies on scheduled products. Wheat is a
scheduled product, meaning that it has received export subsidies in the past. Id. at
307.
229.
Id. at 308.
230.
Id.
231.
Id. at 310.
232.
Id.
233.
Id.
234.
Id.
235.
Id.; see also supra note 207 and accompanying text.
236.
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 311-12.
237.
Id. at 311.
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responsible. 238 Conversely, the United States asserted, that the FSC
scheme did not reduce marketing expenses but merely reduced an
239
FSC's tax liability.
Although the word "subsidy" is not defined within the AA, the
panel found the meaning of subsidy under the AA to be the same as
the meaning of subsidy under the SCM Agreement. 240 Therefore, the
"but for" test used to determine whether a subsidy existed within the
SCM agreement was also used to determine whether a subsidy
existed under the AA. 24 1 As discussed in Part V.A.1.a, the FSC did
constitute a subsidy under the "but for" test and therefore also
constituted a subsidy under the AA.
The panel held that income taxes are a cost of doing business,
and because FSC subsidies reduced an exporter's income tax liability
with respect to marketing activities, they effectively reduced the cost
242
Therefore, Article 9.1(d) of the
of marketing agricultural products.
24 3
met.
AA requirements had been
The panel next turned to Article 3.3 of the AA. 244 The first part
of Article 3.3 of the AA deals with subsidies provided for scheduled
products. 245 The European Union contended that the United States
provided subsidies in excess of quantity commitment levels with
respect to wheat from 1995 to 1997.246 The United States did not
contest the accuracy of the evidence presented by the European
Union to establish this violation. 247 Thus, the panel ruled in favor of
the European Union, holding that the United States violated the first
248
part of Article 3.3 of the AA.
The second part of Article 3.3 of the AA provides that no Member
may provide subsidies to unscheduled agricultural products. 249 The
panel interpreted the phrase "provide subsidies" to mean making the
subsidy available, as well as actually granting or paying the
subsidy. 250 The United States did not contest that FSC subsidies
were available to FSCs, which were engaged in the marketing of any
agricultural product; nor did the United States contest that an FSC

238.
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240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 310.
Id.
Id. at 312.
Cf. id. at 313. In other words, there was a subsidy created by the FSC tax
243.
regime and the subsidy was given to reduce the costs of marketing exports of
agricultural products. See supra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.
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which satisfied the relevant requirements was thereby entitled to
25
FSC subsidies under the relevant provisions of the I.R.C. '
Therefore, the panel found a violation of the second part of Article 3.3
2 52
of the AA.
3. Does the Foreign Sales Corporation Tax Regime Violate Article 8
of the Agreement on Agriculture?
The European Union also asserted that the FSC regime violated
Article 8 of the AA. 253 Article 8 of the AA stipulates that "[e]ach
member undertakes not to provide export subsidies otherwise than in
conformity with this Agreement."'254 Because the United States
violated obligations under Article 3.3 of the AA with respect to wheat
and with respect to all unscheduled products, the panel consequently
found a violation of Article 8.255
4. Summary of the Decision of the Dispute Settlement Panel
The panel held that the FSC tax regime violated Article 3.1(a) of
the SCM Agreement and Articles 3.3, 9.1(d), and 8 of the AA. When
the SCM Agreement or AA is violated, Article 3.8 of the DSU provides
that "in cases where there is an infringement of the obligations
assumed under a covered agreement [including the SCM Agreement
and the Agreement on Agriculture], the action is considered prima
'256
facie to constitute a case of nullification or impairment.
Therefore, the panel recommended that the United States bring the
FSC tax provisions into compliance with the SCM Agreement and AA
by October 1, 2000.257
B. The Appellate Body Decision
The United States appealed the decision, requesting that the
WTO Appellate Body reverse the panel's finding that the United
States violated its obligations under Articles 3.3, 8, and 9.1(d) of the
AA. 258 Additionally, the United States requested that the Appellate
Body review the meaning of "subsidy" under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the
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258.
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Id. at 317.
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SCM Agreement and use footnote 59 as the controllinglegal provision
259
in the case.
The Appellate Body first affirmed the panel's ruling that the U.S.
FSC tax regime fit within the meaning of "subsidy" under Article
1.1(a)(1)(ii). 260 However, the Appellate Body hesitated to use the "but
for" test established by the panel and preferred to look directly at the
treaty language.20 1 The Appellate Body specifically stated,
We would have particular misgivings about using a "but for" test if its
application were limited to situations where there actually existed an
alternative measure, under which the revenues in question would be
taxed, absent the contest measure. It would, we believe, not be difficult
to circumvent such a test by designing a tax regime under which there
would be no general rule that applied formally to the revenues in
262
question, absent the contest measures.

The panel conceded that the "but for" test works in this
particular case, but might not always be the appropriate test to
impose.2 63 Regardless of the test used, the Appellate Body found that
264
the FSC tax regime constituted an export-contingent subsidy.
Therefore, the Appellate Body affirmed the panel's decision that the
FSC measure constituted a prohibited subsidy under Article 3.1(a) of
265
the SCM Agreement.
The United States further argued that the panel erred in its
interpretation of Article 9.1(d) by focusing on the nature of the
activities carried out by the recipient of the subsidy, rather than on
the nature of the subsidy itself.2 66 The United States maintained
that although income taxes may be a cost of doing business, they are
267
not part of the "costs of marketing exports" under Article 9.1(d).
The Appellate Body agreed with the United States that the panel had
268
interpreted Article 9. 1(d) too broadly.
The Appellate Body held that marketing costs are specific types
of costs that differ from general business costs and therefore relate to
the marketing of exports only in the broadest sense. 269 For the FSC
scheme to be inconsistent with Article 3.3 of the AA, the FSC
measure must include an export subsidy within the meaning of
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Article 9.1(d). 270 Because the Appellate Body decided that the export
subsidy did not fit within the meaning of Article 9.1(d), the panel
271
therefore held that there was no violation of Article 3.3 of the AA.
The Appellate Body reversed the panel's decision that FSC tax
breaks were given to reduce the costs of marketing exports of
agricultural products under Article 9.1(d) of the AA and, as a result,
reversed the panel's finding that the United States acted in breach of
272
its obligation under Article 3.3 of the AA.
The Appellate Body also found that the United States breached
its obligations under Articles 10.1 and 8 of the AA.2 73 The FSC
violated Article 10.1 because it was applied in a manner which
resulted in, or threatened to lead to, circumvention of its export
subsidy commitments for both scheduled and unscheduled
agricultural products. 2 74 The FSC tax system violated Article 8
because it provided "export subsidies otherwise than in conformity
with this Agreement and with the commitments as specified in the
275
[U.S.] Schedule.
The Appellate Body recommended that the United States bring
the FSC tax system into conformity with its obligations under the
Agreements by October 1, 2000.276
C. The Subsequent Agreement Between the United States and the
European Union
With EU consent, the October 1, 2000 deadline for compliance
was extended to November 1, 2000.277 The deadline extension was
partially due to the chaos in the 2000 Presidential election. 278 The
European Union realized that Congress could not realistically meet
the deadline in light of the election events. 279 The European Union
did not want to impose sanctions on the United States without giving
the United States a fair chance to comply with the WTO conclusion
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Id. at 35.
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272.
273.
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David Benson et al., News Analysis, New Law Repeals FSC, Implements
277.
New US Tax Scheme for ExtraterritorialIncome, TAX NOTES INT'L, Nov. 27, 2000, at
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and recommendations because the European Union did not want to
28 0
elevate the potential for a trans-Atlantic trade war.

VI. THE FSC REPEAL AND EXTRATERRITORIAL INCOME EXCLUSION ACT

OF 2000
On May 2, 2000, the U.S. government made a proposal to the
European Union to replace the FSC regime with an elective regime
for foreign sales.28 1 Unlike the then-current FSC tax system, the
replacement law would not require that eligible goods be
manufactured in the United States. 28 2 Moreover, there would be a
number of corporations with foreign sales of goods manufactured
28 3
outside the United States that would benefit from the new regime.
The European Union did not respond encouragingly to the proposed
28 4
law.
In an attempt to comply with the WTO ruling, the United States
enacted the FSC Repeal and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of
2000.285 The replacement law represents the third attempt 28 6 in an
ongoing effort by the United States to implement a tax law that aids
U.S. companies by leveling the playing field of international trade
without violating the rules that govern international trade. 28 7 The
passage of the replacement law by the lame-duck 106th Congress,
even before the enactment of some critical budget legislation, reflects
288
its importance to the U.S. economy.

280.
"American officials have warned that if the EU goes ahead with sanctions,
it could unleash a full-scale trade war across the Atlantic. The United States already
has imposed 308 million dollars in sanctions against the EU in trade disputes over
bananas and hormone-treated beef . . ."-a "case" also heard by the WTO. EU will
Request WTO Sanction Authorization: Official, XINHUA COMTEX, Nov. 16, 2000,
available at 2000 WL 29754236.
281.
Portfolio 934-1st, supra note 59, at 9.
282.
S. REP. NO. 106-416, at 5.
283.
Id.
284.
WTO Countries Advance on Trade Round, but Will is Weak: EU, AGENcE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Nov. 21, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24764352 [hereinafter WTO
Countries Advance].
285.
S. REP. NO. 106-416, at 2.
286.
First, DISC was enacted in an attempt to level the playing field of
international trade and also to comply with U.S. international obligations. See supra
note 43. Next, the FSC tax scheme was implemented in an attempt to accomplish the
same goals that the DISC had failed to achieve. See supra note 50. This led to the
third and most recent attempt to fulfill these goals, the enactment of the FSC Repeal
and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion Act of 2000. See supranote 12.
287.
Lubkin, supra note 18, at 32.
288.
Id.
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Most significantly, the replacement law repeals FSC tax laws in
sections 921 through 927 of the I.R.C. 2s 9 Consequently, a corporation
cannot elect to be an FSC after September 30, 2000.290
The legislation also modifies the general rules of U.S. taxation by
fundamentally amending the definition of gross income.2 9 1 The
replacement law starts with the proposition that, for U.S. tax
purposes, gross income does not include extraterritorial income. 292 In
other words, the replacement law eliminates the presumption that
worldwide income is taxable if it does not fall within a specific
exclusion.
Congress contends that the extraterritorial income
excluded by the replacement legislation from the scope of U.S. income
taxation parallels the foreign-source income excluded under most
territorial tax systems, particularly those employed by EU
293
countries.
Congress claims that the replacement law treats all foreign sales
alike, whether manufactured in the United States or abroad. 294 This
is a substantially broader category of income than that which was
exempt from taxation under the former FSC provisions. 295 While
many of the former FSC concepts are incorporated into the
replacement law, the basic exclusion rules function quite differently
296
from the FSC rules.
The basic logic behind the replacement law is that the structure
avoids the creation of a new subsidy because the government does not
2 97
have the right to tax extraterritorial income in the first place.
Also, by allowing a general exemption for extraterritorial income, the
replacement law avoids double taxation on income in much the same
manner as many European and other territorial-type systems. 298

S. REP. No. 106-416, at 5.
289.
See generally Replacement Law, supra note 12.
290.
291.
S. REP. No. 106-416, at 5.
292.
See generally Replacement Law, supra note 12. This initial assumption is
contrary to the general rule under the prior FSC tax regime, which began with the
assumption that all extraterritorial income was included in gross income unless an
exception applied. Id.
293.
S. REP. No. 106-416, at 5. Many scholars believe that the replacement law
suggests that the United States will abandon its global tax structure and move to a
This argument is based primarily on the fact that
purely territorial system.
extraterritorial income is no longer included in the definition of gross income.
However, Manal Corwin from the U.S. Treasury Department made clear that the
United States remains a jurisdiction with a worldwide approach to taxation and that
the replacement law is a narrow exception to the traditional U.S. tax system. Robert
Goulder, U.S. Treasury Official Denies FSC Repeal Signals Move to Territoriality,TAX
NOTES INT'L, Dec. 18, 2000, at 2749.
294.
S. REP. No. 106-416, at 5.
295.
Id.
296.
Id.
Goulder, supra note 293, at 2749.
297.
298.
Id. at 2454.
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Therefore, no foreign tax credit is allowed for income taxes paid with
2 99
respect to such excluded income.
Another distinction from the old law is that individuals may
benefit from the income exclusion provisions.3 00 Any U.S. person or
foreign corporation that elects to be taxed as a U.S. corporation and
meets certain requirements can claim the replacement law's
30
benefits.
A foreign corporation, whether U.S. or foreign-owned, may elect
to claim the extraterritorial income exclusion if: (i) it manufactures
property in its ordinary course of business and (ii) substantially all of
its gross receipts are reasonably expected to be foreign trading gross
receipts. 30 2 "Foreign trading gross receipts" are gross receipts from
the sale, exchange, or other disposition of qualifying foreign trade
property, from the lease or rental of qualifying foreign trade property
for use outside the United States, and for services that are related
and subsidiary to the above activities, if at least fifty percent of the
taxpayer's other foreign trading gross receipts for the year are
derived from those above three activities.3 0 3 Generally, "qualifying
foreign trade income" is gross income from transactions that, if
excluded, results in a reduction of the taxpayer's taxable income, not
to exceed the greater of thirty percent of the taxpayer's foreign sale
and leasing income, one and two-tenths percent of the taxpayer's
income that is from foreign trading gross receipts, or fifteen percent
of the taxpayer's foreign trade income.3 0 4 "Foreign trade income" is a
taxpayer's income that is attributable to foreign trading gross
305
receipts.
The threshold for determining if gross receipts will be treated as
foreign trading gross receipts is whether the gross receipts are
derived from a transaction involving qualifying foreign trade
property. 30 6
"Qualifying foreign trade property" is property
manufactured, produced, grown, or extracted in or outside the United
States that is held for sale, lease, or rental in the ordinary course of
business for direct use, consumption, or disposition outside the
United States. 30 7 Additionally, to be considered qualifying foreign
trade property, not more than fifty percent of the fair market value of
the property can be attributable to articles manufactured, produced,
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grown, or extracted or having other value added outside the United
States and direct, costs for labor performed outside the United
States.30 8 "Foreign trading gross receipts" do not include gross
receipts from a transaction if the qualifying foreign trade property or
services are for ultimate use in the United States, or for use by the
United States and such use is required by law or regulation. 30 9 Gross
receipts from a transaction are foreign trading gross receipts only if
310
certain economic processes take place outside of the United States.
The replacement law also sets forth a foreign economic processes
requirement. 3 11 The foreign economic processes requirement is
satisfied if the taxpayer participates, outside of the United States, in
the solicitation, negotiation, or making of the contract relating to
such transaction and incurs a specified amount of foreign direct costs
312
attributable to the transaction.
The replacement law requires that property manufactured
outside of the United States be manufactured by (1) a domestic
corporation, (2) an individual who is a citizen or resident of the
United States, (3) a foreign corporation that elects to be subject to
U.S. taxation in the same manner as a United States corporation, or
(4) a partnership or other pass-through entity, all of the partners or
313
owners of which are described in (1), (2), or (3) above.
The replacement law is effective for transactions entered into
after September 30, 2000.314 In addition, no corporation may elect to
be an FSC after September 30, 2000.315
The replacement law
provides a transition period for existing FSCs and for binding
contractual agreements. 316
The new rules do not apply to
transactions in the ordinary course of business involving an FSC
before January 1, 2002.317
In comparing the replacement law to the FSC tax regime, it
initially looks as if U.S. tax policy has changed significantly. 3 18 Some
critics believe that the replacement law was enacted at least in part
to appear responsive to the WTO ruling. 319 In reality, however, the
same net reduction in U.S. tax law will be available to U.S. exporters
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under the replacement law as under the FSC tax regime. 20
Conceivably, "the greatest difference between the old FSC regime ...
and the [replacement law] is that foreign manufacturing operations,
including foreign manufacturing done by foreign corporations, can
's 2 1
take advantage of the new rules.

VII. REACTIONS TO THE REPLACEMENT LAW

A. The Response of the European Union to the Replacement Law
Although "the European Union has acknowledged that the
exclusion of foreign income provided for by the FSC replacement [law]
is not limited to U.S. exporters but benefits also companies that sell
and manufacture abroad," the European Union is still not satisfied
that the replacement law fulfills U.S. trade obligations. 322 The
European Union Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, stated that the
new law is "even worse" than the previous one regarding export
323
subsidies.
The European Union contends that, like the FSC scheme, the
replacement law results in the foregoing of tax revenue that is
3 24
otherwise due, thereby conferring a benefit to recipients.
Therefore, the replacement law provides subsidies within the
325
meaning of Article 1 of the SCM Agreement and under the AA.
The European Union further claims that the subsidies provided
by the replacement law are export-contingent, contrary to Article
3.1(a) of the SCM and Articles 3.3, 8, and 10.1 of the AA. 326 The
replacement law also provides treatment less favorable to imported
products than is accorded to similar U.S. products, contrary to Article

111:4 of GATT

1994.327

Lastly, the European Union maintains that the FSC replacement
law contains transitional provisions, which allow companies to
continue to benefit from the WTO-incompatible FSC scheme beyond
the deadline, thus failing to withdraw the subsidy and implement the
328
panel decision.

320.
David Benson et al., supra note 277, at 2454, 2457.
321.
Id.
322.
Daniel Pruzin, FSCs: U.S. Defends FSC Replacement at WTO, Advances
"Pointsof Agreement" with EU, DAILY TAX REP., Dec. 21, 2000, at G-4.
323.
WTO Countries Advance, supra note 284.
324.
Pruzin, supra note 322.
325.
Report of the Panel, supra note 4, at 4.
326.
Id.
327.
Id. at 2.
328.
Id. at 5.
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The European Union estimated and requested damages of over
four billion dollars3 29 in annual sanctions against the United Statesthe largest sanctions demanded in WTO history.38 0 The European
Union said its figure for damages was based on the value of the
33 1
subsidies granted by the United States under the FSC tax regime.
Under WTO rules, the European Union had to submit an indicative
list of products eligible for sanctions.3 32 "The DSB will appoint an

329.
The estimate is based on the value of the subsidy provided by the United
States to exporters through the FSC regime as of February 2000.
330.
Weiner, supra note 2.
331.
EU/United States: EU asks for USD4 Billion in Export Subsidy Sanctions,
EUR. REP., Nov. 18, 2000, at 508, available at 2000 WL 24319928.
332.
On November 17, 2000, the European Communities filed a statement with
the WTO stating:
As the United States has failed to implement the DSB recommendations and
rulings by 1 November 2000, and as envisaged in the agreed procedure ....the
European Communities hereby requests authorization from the DSB to take
appropriate countermeasures and to suspend concessions pursuant to Article
4.10 of the SCM agreement and Article 22.2 of the DSU in the amount of US
$4043 million per year.
The European Communities intends to take
countermeasures and suspension of concessions in the form of the suspension of
tariff concessions and related obligations under the GATT 1994 by imposing an
additional duty of 100 percent ad valorem above bound custom duties on a final
list of United States . . . : Live animals; meat and edible meat offal; dairy
produce, birds' eggs, natural honey, edible products of animal origin, not
elsewhere specified or included; products of animal origin not elsewhere
specified or included; edible vegetables and certain roots and tubers; edible
fruit and nuts; peel of citrus fruits or melons; cereals; products of the milling
industry; malt; starches; inulin; wheat gluten; oil seeds and oleaginous fruits;
miscellaneous grains, seeds and fruit; industrial or medical plants; straw and
fodder; animal or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products; prepared
edible fats; animal or vegetable waxes; preparations of meat, fish or
crustaceans, molluscs or other aquatic invertebrates; sugars and sugar
confectionery; preparations of cereals, flour, starch or milk; pastrycooks'
products, preparations of vegetables, fruits, nuts or other parts of plants;
miscellaneous edible preparations; residues and waste from the food industries;
prepared animal fodder; essential oils and resinoids; perfumery, cosmetic or
toilet preparations; soaps, organic surface-active agents, washing preparations,
lubricating preparations, artificial waxes, prepared waxes, polishing or souring
preparations, candles and similar articles, modeling pastes, "dental waxes" and
dental preparations with a basis of plaster; albuminous substances; modified
starches; glues; enzymes; hides and skins (other than furskins) and leather;
articles of leather; saddlery and harness; travel goods, handbags and similar
containers; articles of animal gut (other than silkworm gut); furskins and
artificial fur; articles thereof wood and articles of wood; wood charcoal; paper
and paperboard; articles of paper pulp, paper or paperboard; books,
newspapers, pictures and other products of the printing industry; manuscripts,
typescripts and plans; wool, fine and coarse animal hair; yarn and fabrics of
horsehair; cotton; man-made filaments; carpets and other textile floor
coverings; articles of apparel and clothing accessories, knitted or crocheted;
articles of apparel and clothing accessories, not knitted or crocheted; other
made up textile articles; sets; worn clothing and worn textile articles; rags;
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arbitrator before the final level of sanctions are set, however, and the
European Union has agreed to abide by the level of sanctions that the
arbitrator approves. 33 3
On November 17, 2000, the European Union requested that the
United States enter into consultations under Articles 4 and 21.5 of
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes, Article 4 of the SCM Agreement, Article 19 of
the Agreement on Agriculture, and Article XXIII: I of the GATT 1994
with respect to the replacement law. 33 4 Consultations were held
between the parties on December 4, 2000 in Geneva, but the
consultations failed to settle the dispute. 335 On December 7, 2000,
the European Union requested that a panel be established, as "there
is a disagreement to the existence or consistency with a covered
agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations
and rulings" of the DSB. 336 Australia, Canada, India, Jamaica, and
337
Japan joined the European Union as third parties to the dispute.
B. The Findings of the World Trade OrganizationRegarding the
Replacement Law
The
consisted
2000. 33 8
that the

DSP established to consider the U.S. replacement law
of the same panelists as in the original FSC dispute in
Before addressing the issues at hand, the DSP first noted
European Union agreed that "there would no longer be a

footwear, gaiters and the like; parts of such articles; ceramic products; glass
and glassware; natural or cultured pearls, precious or semi-precious stones,
precious metals, metals clad with precious metal, and articles thereof; imitation
jewelry; coins; iron or steel; articles of iron or steel; copper and articles thereof;
aluminium and articles thereof; tools, implements, cutlery, spoons and forks, of
base metal; parts thereof of base metal; miscellaneous articles of base metal;
nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical applicances; parts thereof;
electrical machinery and equipment and parts thereof, sound recorders and
reproducers, television image and sound recorders and reproducers; and parts
and accessories of such articles; aircraft, spacecraft, and parts thereof; toys,
games and sports requisites; parts and accessories thereof.
Recourse by the European Communities to Article 4.10 of the SCM Agreement and
Article 22.2 of the DSU, United States-Tax Treatment for 'Toreign Sales Corporations",
WT/DS108/13 (Nov. 17, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1726528.
333.
Trevor Drury & Chuck Gnaedinger, European Union Asks for Sanctions
Against the United States in FSC Dispute, WORLDWIDE TAX DAILY, Nov. 20, 2000, at
224-1.
334.
Second Report of the Panel, supra note 14, at 3.
335.
Id. at 4.
336. Id.
337.
Id.
338.
Id. The Panel was composed of Mr. Crawford Falconer as Chairman, and
Mr. Didier Chambovey and Professor Seung Wha Chang as Members. Id.
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prohibited subsidy within the meaning of Article 3 of the SCM
Agreement" if the United States eliminated the requirements that the
property be held for use outside the United States and the fifty
percent "foreign content limitation. ' 339 Based on this concession, the
DSP concluded that it would focus its examination on those two
aspects of the replacement law. 340 The European Union set forth
several arguments in which it asserted that the replacement law
continued to violate international agreements.
1. The Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

a.
Does the
Contribution?

Replacement

Law

Create

a

Subsidy/Financial

The first issue addressed by the DSP was whether the
"exclusion" from gross income of certain extraterritorial income in the
replacement law gives rise to a financial contribution in the form of a
foregoing of government revenue that is otherwise due within the
meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement. 341 Ultimately,
the panel sought to determine whether or not the replacement law
created a subsidy.
As noted, Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM
Agreement states:
For the purposes of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist
if: (a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public
body within the territory of a Member where: . . . (ii) government
revenue that is otherwise due or not collected and . . . (b) a benefit is
342
thereby conferred.

As in the original FSC dispute, the panel held that a defined
normative benchmark had to be established from which a comparison
could be made between the revenue actually raised and the revenue
that would have otherwise been raised.3 43 The panel pointed to its
original decision in the FSC dispute in holding that, when
determining whether the government has given up an entitlement to
raise revenue that it could otherwise have raised, it cannot be an
entitlement in the abstract, because governments, in theory, could
tax all revenues.3 44 Thus, the panel held that the term "otherwise
due" implies some kind of comparison between the revenues due
under the contested measure and the revenues that would be due in

339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.

Id. at 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18.
Id.
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some other situation. 345 The panel further stated that the basis of
the comparison must be the tax rules applied by the Member State in
346
question.
In the view of the European Union, there is no general U.S.
taxation rule excluding extraterritorial income from taxation since
the majority of extraterritorial income is subject to the normal rate of
taxation. 347 The European Union argued that the replacement law
does not qualitatively define a class or category of income that is
excluded from the tax base, but rather lays down conditions for the
non-taxation of a part of extraterritorial income-qualifying foreign
trade income-that would otherwise be taxed. 348 The European
Union argued, therefore, that the replacement law gives rise to a
foregoing of revenue that is otherwise due and thus to a financial
contribution within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM
Agreement. 349 The European Union asserted that the "prevailing
domestic standard" in the United States is that "corporate income
from a commercial activity" may be taxed, if it is earned by a U.S.
corporation. 350 Thus, the European Union also argued that the
benchmark for assessing the replacement law under Article
1.1(a)(1)(ii) should be the situation prevailing if the conditions 351 are
3 52
not fulfilled.
The United States responded that the replacement law is not a
"financial contribution" within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of
the SCM Agreement.3 53 The United States argued that "the foregoing
of revenue -otherwise due means that a government has refrained
from collecting income that in another circumstance would be legally
owed to the government. '354 The United States asserted that the
replacement law redefines the concept of gross income and that the
revised definition of gross income is the "prevailing domestic
standard" for U.S. taxation.3 55 The United States contended that it
lacked statutory authority to tax outside the definition of gross
income. 356 In other words, there is no general rule of taxation that
would apply "but for" the definition of gross income. The United

345.
Id. at 20.
Id.
346.
Id.
347.
Id.
348.
Id.
349.
Id.
350.
The conditions referenced are notably the sale "not for use within the
351.
United States" and the "foreign content limitation." Id.
Id.
352.
353.
Id. at 19.
354.
Id.
355.
Id.
Id.
356.
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States further -asserted the "exception" concerning extraterritorial
income that is not qualifying foreign trade income is a revenueraising exception; without it, all extraterritorial income would be
excluded from gross income and revenues would be lower. 357 The
United States argued that the exclusion of extraterritorial income
from U.S. taxation represents a shift in U.S. taxing jurisdiction.3 5 8
Thus, the normative benchmark for U.S. taxation of foreign income
has shifted and the prevailing domestic standard is that
extraterritorial income is not taxable because it is not included within
3 59
the definition of gross income.
The panel narrowed the main issue to whether the "exclusion" of
extraterritorial income can properly be characterized as a situation in
which no revenue is inherently due, or whether it is a situation in
which revenue otherwise due is foregone.3 60 The panel then turned to
the U.S. replacement law. 36 1 The panel pointed out that certain
income is "excluded" from taxation. 362 To qualify as "excluded"
extraterritorial income, several stringently selective qualitative
conditions and quantitative requirements must be satisfied. 363 The
panel pointed out that where income does not qualify for the
"exclusion" from gross income upon the fulfillment of the replacement
law's stringently selective conditions, it is not shielded from
taxation.3 64 Income that does not meet the selective conditions is
part of gross income and is subject to taxation under otherwise
3 65
applicable U.S. taxation laws.
As analyzed, the panel found it "clear to us that there is a
'prevailing' domestic standard and that the measure at issue
functions, indeed, as an effective departure from it."3 66 The panel
illustrated its point with the following example: income earned by a
U.S. corporate taxpayer in transactions not involving foreign trading
gross receipts or qualifying foreign trade property would ordinarily be
subject to taxation.3 67 Thus, the panel held that the normative U.S.
benchmark for taxation is that extraterritorial income is taxable
368
despite the definition of gross income.

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The panel stated that by treating as non-taxable certain income
on the basis of highly selective qualitative conditions and
quantitative requirements, the replacement law effectively carves
income out from "another situation." 369 The "other situation" is the
one that prevails where the replacement law's conditions for
obtaining an "exclusion" are not fulfilled. 3 0 For example, where
goods are for use within the United States or where they do not
satisfy the foreign articles/labor limitation, the conditions are not
These analyses led the panel to conclude that this
fulfilled.
3 71
constitutes foregoing of revenue otherwise due.
The panel explicitly rejected the U.S. argument that it can
exclude certain income from the definition of gross income and that,
when it does so, the "excluded" income is, by definition, not otherwise
due within the meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM
Agreement. 372 The panel responded to the U.S. argument by stating
that the examination as to whether there is revenue foregone that is
otherwise due must be based on actual substantive realities and not
restricted to the pure formalistic arguments the United States
asserted.3 73 Looking to section 114(a) of the replacement law, the
panel read that "gross income does not include extraterritorial
income." 374 In section 114(b), the panel read that this "exclusion"
375
does not apply to certain extraterritorial income.
Looking to section 114(e), the panel saw that "extraterritorial
income" is defined as ". . . the gross income of the taxpayer
attributable to foreign trading gross receipts." 376 In addition, the
replacement law defines "qualifying foreign trade income" as "the
amount of gross income which, if excluded, will result in a reduction
of the taxable income of the taxpayer. . . ."377 The panel found that it
is not discernable from the replacement law's wording whether
extraterritorial income is actually "excluded" from gross income or is
rather gross income that may become "excluded" upon fulfillment of
378
certain conditions.
Furthermore, the panel pointed out the risky systemic
37 9
implications inherent in the approach the United States advocated.
Particularly revealing in this regard was the U.S. response to the

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 25-26.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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panel when asked whether the United States believed that there
would be revenue foregone that was otherwise due within the
meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement if the U.S. legislation
provided that "gross income does not include income generated from
export activities."38 0 The United States was of the view that ". . . the

ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) suggests that in
such a situation there would not be a financial contribution ....

as

the tax revenue on export activities would not be otherwise due under
the law of the Member, which is the normative benchmark for Article
'38
1 analysis. '
The panel reasoned that, taken to its logical extreme, the U.S.
argument would be that a government could opt to bestow financial
contributions in the form of fiscal incentives simply by modulating
the "outer boundary" of its "tax jurisdiction" or by manipulating the
definition of the tax base to accommodate any "exclusion" or
"exemption" or "exception" it desired; there could never be a foregoing
of revenue otherwise due.38 2

In short, such an approach would

eviscerate the subsidy provisions in the SCM Agreement.3 83 The
panel concluded that the "exclusion" from U.S. taxation of certain
income on the basis of the replacement law's highly selective
qualitative conditions and quantitative requirements results in the
foregoing of revenue which is otherwise due.38 4

Therefore, the

replacement law gives rise to a financial contribution within the
38 5
meaning of Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the SCM Agreement.
b. Is a Benefit Conferred by the Subsidy?
Having found that the tax "exclusion" under the replacement law
gives rise to a financial contribution, the panel next examined
whether a benefit is thereby conferred within the meaning of Article
1.1(b). 38 6 Under the replacement law, a taxpayer involved in a
qualifying transaction may exclude qualifying foreign trade income
from its gross income and thereby reduce its U.S. tax liability; 38 7 it is
therefore "better off' than it would have been absent the contribution,
and a benefit has been conferred.38 8 In sum, there exists a financial

380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
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contribution conferring a benefit, thus a subsidy eiists within the
88 9
meaning of Article 1.1 of the SCM Agreement.
c. Is the Subsidy Export-Contingent?
The panel considered whether the subsidy is contingent upon
exporting within the meaning of Article 3.1(a) of the SCM
Agreement.3 90 The heart of the disagreement between the parties
was the U.S. contention that the exclusion of extraterritorial income
is not export-contingent, because such income could be earned in
many ways besides exporting U.S. goods. 39 1 The European Union
asserted instead that the subsidy is export-contingent with respect3 to
92
U.S.-produced goods because it is conditioned upon exportation.
The panel stated the issue as "whether the export of U.S. goods is a
'condition' for satisfying the requirement of 'use outside the United
393
States' and therefore, for receiving a subsidy.
3 94
export-contingent, the underlying
For a subsidy to be de jure
legal instrument does not always have to provide expressis verbis that
the subsidy is available only upon fulfillment of the condition of
export performance.3 95 Such conditionality can also be derived by
necessary implication.3 96 The phrase "foreign trading gross receipts"
does not include receipts of the taxpayer from a transaction if the
qualifying foreign trade property is for ultimate use in the United
States. 3 97 Instead, the replacement law limits situations of nontaxation to property that is for ultimate use outside the United
States. 398 The panel decided that, based on this fact, the subsidy is
399
The
only available to transactions relating to export property.
that
"clear
panel held that the words of the replacement law make
within the
the subsidy is not available in relation to goods produced
400
States.
United
the
within
use
for
United States and sold
The fact that the definition of the term "qualifying foreign trade
property" refers to property manufactured, produced, grown, or
extracted within or outside the United States was, according to the
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391.
392.
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394.
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4
United States;, the most significant aspect of the definition. 01
According to the United States, this reference shows that the
replacement law applies equally to all foreign transactions
irrespective of whether goods are produced in the United States or
abroad and thus non-taxation is not export-contingent. 40 2 The
all
European Union argued that it is not necessary to show 40that
3
subsidies under the replacement law were export-contingent.
The panel did not agree with the U.S. argument. 40 4 The panel
held that the statute's words themselves make it clear that exporting
is a necessary precondition to qualify for the subsidy. 40 5 With respect
to U.S.-produced goods, the existence and amount of the subsidy
depends upon of the amount of income arising from the exportation of
such goods. 40 6 In relation to U.S.-produced goods, the existence of
such income is clearly conditioned upon the exportation of such goods
from the United States. 40 7 Additionally, the panel addressed the
argument of the United States that U.S. manufacturers may earn
extraterritorial income without exporting, as they have the option to
produce and sell outside the United States in a wholly non-U.S.
transaction. 40 8 The panel held that the opportunity to engage in
wholly non-U.S. transactions does not alter the fundamental reality
that, for U.S.-produced goods, export is a necessary precondition for
benefiting from the subsidy under the replacement law due to the
requirement of "use outside the United States. '40 9 The panel agreed
with the EU argument that it is not necessary that the replacement
law involve exclusively subsidies that are export-contingent in order
to make a finding that the replacement law provides prohibited
export subsidies. 410 In reaching this conclusion, the panel found
support for its view that export-contingent subsidies may exist in the
context of a broader subsidy scheme in the reasoning of the Appellate
Body in Canada-Aircraft,where the Appellate Body stated:

The fact that some of TPC's contributions, in some industry sectors, are
not contingent upon export performance does not necessarily mean that
the same is true of all of TPC's contributions. It is enough to show that
one or some of TPC's contributions do constitute subsidies contingent
41 1
upon export performance.

401.

Id. at 30.

402.
403.

Id.
Id. at 31.

404.

Id.

405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.
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Id.
Id.
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As long as there is a differentiation between the treatment of
those domestically-produced goods depending on whether they are
exported or sold domestically, there exists a subsidy that is
412
contingent on export.
d. Does the Export-Contingent Subsidy Fall Within the Exception of
Footnote 59?
The United States argued that even if the replacement law's
exclusions are an export-contingent subsidy, it is not prohibited
because the fifth sentence of footnote 59, when read in conjunction
with footnote 5, provides that measures to avoid double-taxation of
4 13
foreign-source income are not prohibited by the SCM Agreement.
The fifth sentence of footnote 59 provides that "paragraph (e) is not
intended to limit a Member from taking measures to avoid the double
taxation of foreign-source income earned by its enterprises or the
Footnote 5 provides that,
enterprises of another Member. '4 14
"measures referred to in Annex I as not constituting export subsidies
shall not be prohibited under this or any other provision of this
'415
Agreement.
In order for the United States to have prevailed on the basis of
footnotes 59 and 5 of the SCM Agreement, the panel had to find that
the replacement law was a measure to avoid the double taxation of
foreign-source income and that the fifth sentence of footnote 59 falls
within the scope of footnote 5 of the SCM Agreement. 416 For a
measure to fall within the scope of the fifth sentence of footnote 59, it
must satisfy each of three elements: (i) to avoid, (ii) the double
taxation, (iii) of foreign-source income earned by the enterprises of
4 17
the Member concerned.
First, the panel turned to the term "to avoid" in footnote 59,418
and held incidental prevention of double taxation would not, in and of
itself, be sufficient to bring the measure within the scope of footnote
59.419 In examining the overall structure, design, and operation of
the replacement law, the panel felt that the parameters of the law do
not roughly approximate the parameters of a measure to avoid the
420
double taxation of income.
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at 35-36.
at 38.
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The panel noted that the replacement law is unusually broad for
a measure whose purpose is to avoid double taxation. 421 At the same
time, the extraterritorial income excluded from taxation does not
include a range of income that is potentially subject to taxation in
other jurisdictions. 422 Thus, the replacement law is unusually
narrow for a measure whose asserted purpose is to avoid double
taxation. 423 Additionally, the panel noted that the replacement law
overlaps with an extensive system of bilateral agreements to avoid
double taxation through foreign tax credits, and its application is not
designed to cover gaps in these agreements. 424 Taken together, these
facts led the panel to conclude that the replacement law is not a
measure taken to avoid the double taxation of foreign-source income
42 5
within the meaning of footnote 59's exception.
2. The Agreement on Agriculture
The European Union contended that the replacement law gives
rise to export subsidies within the meaning of the AA, and that the
subsidies it provides are contrary to Articles 10.1 and 8 of the
Agreement. 426 The panel defined the issue as whether, for purposes
of the anti-circumvention provisions of Article 10.1 of the AA, the
subsidies to which the replacement law gives rise constitute subsidies
contingent on export performance, other than those listed in Article
9.1 of the Agreement, as defined in Article 1(e) of the AA.427 The
panel stated that its reasoning and conclusions with respect to Article
1.1 and 3.1 of the SCM Agreement were also applicable as regarding
whether the replacement law gives rise to subsidies contingent on
export performance within the meaning of Article 1(e) of the AA for
the purposes of Article 10.1 of the AA.428 Thus, the replacement law
does give rise to export-contingent subsidies under the AA.
The next issue the panel addressed was whether the export
subsidies are "applied in a manner which results in, or which
threatens to lead to, circumvention of export subsidy commitments"
within the meaning of Article 10.1 of the AA. 429 The panel pointed
out that the replacement law creates a legal entitlement for
recipients to receive export subsidies not listed in Article 9.1, with

421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.

Id. at 40.
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Id.
Id. at 43.
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respect to both scheduled 430 and unscheduled agricultural
products. 431 Moreover, it was noted that the replacement law does
not set forth any limitation on the amount of extraterritorial income,
and thus on the amount of qualifying foreign trade income, that may
be claimed with respect to eligible transactions, or the amount of
export subsidies unqualified. 4 32 Thus, with respect to unscheduled
agricultural products, the panel held that the replacement law
involves the application of export subsidies not listed in Article 9.1, in
a manner that, at the very least, "threatens to lead to circumventions
4
[of the] export subsidy commitment" in Article 3.3. 33
As for scheduled agricultural products, the replacement law
allows for the provision of an unlimited amount of subsidies and,
therefore, scheduled agricultural products benefit from those
subsidies even after the reduction in commitment levels specified by
the U.S. schedule for those products are reached. 434 Therefore, the
panel concluded that the United States acted inconsistently with its
obligations under Article 10.1 of the AA by applying the export
subsidies, with respect to both scheduled and unscheduled
agricultural products, in a manner that, at the very least, threatens
to circumvent its export subsidy commitments under Article 3.3 of the
AA. 4 3 5 Furthermore, the panel held that by acting inconsistently
with Article 10.1 of the AA, the United States necessarily acted in a
manner inconsistent with its obligation under Article 8 of the AA "not
to provide export subsidies otherwise than in conformity with this
,,436
Agreement ....
3. Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994
The European Union contended that the foreign articles/labor
limitations 437 are inconsistent with Article III:4 of the GATT 1994.438

430.
Id.; see also supra note 228 and accompanying text.
431.
Second Report of the Panel, supra note 14, at 44; see also supra note 226
and accompanying text.
432.
Second Report of the Panel, supra note 14, at 44.
433.
Id. at 45.
434.
Id.
435.
Id.
436.
Id.
Id. Under the replacement law, "qualifying foreign trade property" is
437.
property made within or outside the United States, and sold for ultimate use outside
the United States, no more than fifty percent of the fair market value of which is
attributable to "articles manufactured, produced, grown or extracted outside the
United States" and "direct costs for labour ... performed outside the United States."
438.

Id. Article III:4 of the GATT 1994 proves in relevant part:
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The European Union argued that such limitations are a requirement
contained in the, law that provides less favorable treatment to
imported parts and materials than to similar domestic goods with
respect to their internal use in the production of goods within the
United States.43 9 Conversely, the United States argued that the
replacement law does not require the use of domestic rather than
imported goods. 440 The United States argued that goods could meet
hundred percent of the
the foreign articles/labor limitation even if one
44 1
fair market value of their input is foreign.
The issues the panel addressed were: (a) whether the imported
and domestic products at issue are "like products," (b) whether the
measure at issue is a "law, regulation, or requirement affecting their
internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution,
or use," and (c) whether the imported products are accorded less
'442
favorable treatment than that accorded to like domestic products.
The panel stated that the mere fact that a good had an origin in
443
the United States does not render it "unlike" an imported good.
Thus, the panel held the "like product" element of Article 111:4 was
satisfied. The panel held that the foreign articles/labor limitation is a
"law or requirement," as it is a U.S. statute. 444 On the basis of the
text and context of Article 111:4 and in light of the object and purpose
of the GATT and the WTO Agreement, the panel held that Article
111:4 of the GATT 1994 applies to measures conditioning access to
446
income tax advantages with respect to certain products.
Next, the European Union argued that it is sufficient that the
limitation "affects" the competitive position of the imported product
on the market. 44 6 The European Union stated that the replacement
law provides an incentive to source inputs domestically because this
enhances the chances that a U.S. producer would qualify for the tax
benefit. This is sufficient to violate Article 111:4, which guarantees
equality of competitive opportunities. 447 On the contrary, the United
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States argued that the replacement law does not affect competitive
conditions between imported and like domestic products as it does not
require the use of any U.S.-origin goods for a transaction to earn
excluded extraterritorial income. 448 Goods can meet this requirement
even if one hundred percent of the fair market value of their inputs is
449
foreign.
The panel pointed out that by reason of the foreign articles/labor
limitation of the replacement law, the use of U.S.-origin products
contributes to obtaining the exclusion while the use of imported
products does not. 450 Thus, the panel considered that the foreign
articles/labor limitation is a measure that affects the internal use of
imported products, even if ways other than the use of goods exist to
45 1
impute permissible fair market value.
Lastly, the panel addressed whether the replacement law
accords imported products less favorable treatment than that
accorded to like domestic products by reason of the foreign
articles/labor limitation. 45 2 The panel again pointed to the fact that
the foreign articles/labor limitation acts as an incentive to source
inputs domestically because this enhances the chances of qualifying
for the tax benefit. 4 53 The panel pointed out that the replacement law
contains a statutory requirement that is expressly and explicitly
454
origin-based.
Furthermore, the panel pointed out that the foreign
articles/labor limitation explicitly places a limit on the proportion of
the fair market value of a product that can be derived from imported
products and foreign labor only; it places no similar constraint on the
proportion of the fair market value of a product that can be derived
from domestic products and labor. 455 In other words, use of imported
products by a manufacturer in the United States cannot contribute to
the fulfillment of the foreign articles/labor limitation, whereas, the
use of a domestic product can.4 56 Thus, the panel found an advantage
conferred upon the use of domestic products that is not conferred
upon the use of imported products. 457 As far as goods are concerned,
the foreign articles/labor limitation creates an incentive to use
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domestic rather than imported goods; therefore, domestic products
4 58
are treated more favorably than other products.
4. Transitional Issues
The European Union argued that by maintaining the availability
of FSC subsidies for transactions affected by existing FSCs between
September 30, 2000 and December 31, 2001, the United States failed
to withdraw the FSC subsidies as required by Article 4.7 of the SCM
Agreement and the recommendations and rulings of the DSB, and
failed to comply with its obligations under Article 21 DSU. 459 The
United States did not dispute that prohibited FSC subsidies
continued to be available after the time-period set for compliance in
this dispute. 460 However, the United States pointed out that the
WTO panels have, in the past, excused procedural violations in the
absence of prejudice to the complaining party, essentially taking into
46 1
account equitable considerations.
The panel noted that according to the U.S. transition plan, the
FSC subsidies continue in operation for one year if an FSC in
existence before September 30, 2000 has not entered into any longterm, binding contracts with unrelated third parties before
September 30, 2000. Additionally, with respect to FSCs that have
entered into long-term, binding contracts with unrelated parties
before September 30, 2000, the replacement law does not alter the tax
treatment for an indefinite period of time. 46 2 Based on the above
transition provisions, the panel sided with the European Union. The
panel held that the United States had not fully withdrawn the
prohibited FSC subsidies and therefore failed to implement the
463
recommendations and rulings of the DSB and Appellate Body.
Furthermore, the panel chose not to excuse the procedural
46 4
violations.
5. Summary of the Decision of the Dispute Settlement Panel
The panel held that the replacement law violates Article 3.1(a)
and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement, Article 10.1 and Article 8 of the AA,
and Article 111:4 of the GATT 1994.465 Additionally, the United
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States failed to implement the recommendations and rulings of
Thus, the panel recommended that466the
original FSC dispute.
replacement law be nullified according to Article 3.8 of the DSU.

VIII. THE RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
On October 15, 2001, the United States reacted to the WTO
holding by filing an official notice of appeal. 467 In the notice, the
United States seeks review of the panel's findings that the
replacement law involves export subsidies prohibited by Article
3.1(a) 468 of the SCM Agreement, and the corollary finding that the
United States has acted inconsistently with its obligation under
Article 3.2469 of the SCM Agreement. 470 The United States also seeks
review by the Appellate Body of the panel's findings and related legal
interpretations that the replacement law is inconsistent with
obligations under Article 8471 and 10.1472 of the AA and Article
III:4473 of the GATT 1994. 474 Lastly, the United States seeks review
by the Appellate Body of the finding that the United States has not
fully withdrawn the FSC subsidies found to be prohibited export
subsidies inconsistent with Article 3.1(a) 475 of the SCM Agreement
and has therefore failed to implement the recommendations and
rulings of the DSB made pursuant to Article 4.7476 of the SCM
Agreement. 477 The Appellate Body is expected to make a decision in
mid-January of 2002.478
479
Many U.S. officials support the appeal; however, motives vary.
Some believe that the WTO's opinion was "in error" and that the
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United States will prevail on appeal. 480 Others do not necessarily
believe the United States has a chance of winning the appeal, but
support the appeal in order to allow the United States more time to
48 1
determine the most appropriate resolution.
Regardless of the reasoning behind the appeal, it seems unlikely
that the United States will prevail. Thus far the United States has
48 2
made very formalistic arguments in defending its tax regime.
Based on the three decisions issued by the WTO panels, it seems that
483
the WTO is interested in substance rather than form.
Under a substance analysis, it will be difficult for the United
States to prevail because the replacement law functions almost
exactly like the FSC tax regime. The only significant difference is in
form, not in effect. The FSC tax regime started with the premise that
extraterritorial income was generally taxable unless it fell under the
FSC exclusion, in which case the income was not subject to U.S.
taxation. 484 By contrast, the replacement law starts with the premise
that extraterritorial income is not taxable unless it falls within an
exception in which case it is subject to U.S. taxation. 48 5 Therefore, in
both situations, the U.S. government is excluding income from
taxation only if it meets certain requirements, which are almost
identical under both the FSC and replacement tax systems. Based on
the lack of actual substantive changes in the U.S. FSC tax structure,
it seems unlikely that the United States would prevail on appeal.
Despite the European Union's failure to eliminate sanctions as
an option if the United States loses on appeal, U.S. and EU officials
have repeatedly stated that they are looking at other options for

480.
Extraterritorial Income: U.S. To Appeal WTO Ruling Against
ExtraterritorialIncome Exclusion Act, DAILY TAX REP., Oct. 11, 2001, at G-7. U.S.
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick said, "[w]e have decided to appeal because we
believe the decision was in error." Id. Letters written by eleven House Democrats, led
by Representatives Charles Rangel (NY) and Sander M. Levin (MI), said that the WTO
decision was "deeply flawed." See infra note 481 and accompanying text.
481.
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WTO Ruling on FSC Replacement, DAILY TAX REP., Sept. 14, 2001, at G-5. Some
Members of the House of Representatives sent U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick a letter stating that a decision not to appeal the WTO's "errors" would also
sacrifice negotiating leverage with the European Union to secure the "key objective" of
ensuring that differences in U.S. and foreign tax regimes do not disadvantage U.S.
workers, farmers, and businesses in international competition. Id. The letter stated,
"If the United States were to permit the panel report, with none of its errors corrected,
to be adopted, we would be negotiating from a position of weakness." Id.
482.
See generally Report of the Panel, supra note 4; Report of the Appellate
Body, supra note 9; Second Report of the Panel, supra note 14.
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resolving the dispute. 486 The Bush administration stated, "We need
to manage this dispute so it doesn't spill over into other issues. The
worst thing that could happen would be to have some kind of
confrontation over this. Neither side wants this to happen. '48 7 The
feeling that the tax dispute must be solved by compromise has
intensified since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Even
industries that would be affected by a change in the U.S. tax
structure agree that the United States and European Union should
cooperate with each other to reach a solution to the dispute. 48 8 As
Joel Johnson, vice president international at the Aerospace
Industries Association, said, "It is difficult to threaten a trade war
with each other when it looks like you are going to be fighting a real
''48 9
war together.
However, if no agreement can be reached, the United States
loses on appeal, and the European Union decides to impose sanctions,
it is unclear exactly which products might be affected by those
sanctions. 49° Considering the United States placed one hundred
percent duties on a number of4 92EU products during the banana
dispute, 491 anything is fair game.
Assuming the United States loses on appeal, the United States
could respond in several different ways. One option is for the United
States to ignore the WTO ruling and risk retaliation. It does not
seem that this would be the best strategic decision for the United
States, however, because of its current political need to maintain
strong international relationships. It is also very likely that the
European Union would respond by initiating a trade war. The United
States has made clear it does not want to risk retaliation in the form
that would
of a major trade war with the European Union because
493
have significant harmful effects on the world economy.
A second alternative is for the United States to pay the
sanctions, if imposed by the European Union. However, it is unlikely

ETI: US, EU will Need to Manage' Tax Dispute or Risk Harm to Overall
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Ties, DAILY TAX REP., Oct. 12, 2001, at G-3 [hereinafter ETI: US, EU].
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of Attacks, DEFENSE DAILY INT'L, Sept. 21, 2001, available at 2001 WL 7476068.
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490.
into Europe that could be targeted for sanctions. Experts Advise What to Do Now That
WTO Has Shot Down FSC Replacement Law, MANAGING EXPORTS, Sept. 1, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 17700319. The list includes items such as steel, meat products,
cereals, textiles, and aircraft. Id. The list excludes some items such as chemicals,
pharmaceuticals, fertilizers, plastics, rubber articles, and beverages. Id.
European Union Mulls Trade Sanctions vs. US, WORLD TRADE, Sept. 1,
491.
2001, availableat 2001 WL 6716735.
492.
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the United States would make this choice. U.S. Special Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick has compared EU sanctions of the
magnitude proposed to "dropping a nuclear bomb" on the global
trading system. 494 The effects of paying the sanctions would require
the United States to overhaul its current tax system. Although a
major overhaul in the tax system is a possible, it is unlikely that the
United States would put itself in a position where it had such limited
choices. Moreover, in light of the fact that both sides hope to reach a
compromise solution, it is improbable that the dispute will escalate to
this level.
A third option is to remove the tax breaks, effectively increasing
taxes on American companies. 495 Although many U.S. companies
would be hit hard 496 if such a tax scheme were adopted, this idea has
gained some supporters who claim the FSC tax scheme is "a pure gift
for corporations that would be exporting anyway. 497 Despite limited
support for imposing generally applicable tax laws on exporters and
non-exporters, it would be surprising if this option were adopted since
U.S. exporters include large corporations4 98 with extremely powerful
lobbying groups.
Clearly, the main concern that arises when
considering generally applicable tax laws is how such laws would
affect U.S. exporting and thus the U.S. economy. Between 1992 and
1997, export activity led to one-third of the economic growth in the
United States. 499 If the tax reductions offered to U.S. exporters are
significantly reduced, this could lead to a significant economic
contraction.5 00 With the U.S. economy already ailing, an economic
contraction of this proportion could cause considerable damage.
A fourth option is for the United States to adopt a territorial tax
structure similar to the tax structure in EU countries.
Representative Bill Thomas (R-Cal.), chairman of the House Ways
and Means Committee, favors a territorial system under which only
domestic earnings would be subject to U.S. tax. 50 1 Thomas and other

494.

William Drozdiak, EU May Hit U.S. with $4 Billion In Penalties;

Commission Calls Tax Credits Illegal, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2001, at El.
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A Gas tax hike?/ With notions like Matsunaka's,Democrats could use a new

playbook, GAZETTE, (Metro), at 6, Aug. 29, 2001, available at 2001 WL 27136664
[hereinafter A Gas tax hike].
496.
For example, Boeing, which sells roughly seventy percent of the commercial
jets it produced overseas and is the nation's leading exporter, saved $291 million in
2000 and more than $730 million over the past four years as a result of the tax breaks.
Blumenthal, supra note 76, at D1.
497.
Id. (quoting Representative Pete Stark (D-CA), a Member of the Ways and
Means Committee).
498.
See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
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advocates contend that adopting a territorial system would benefit
American companies while bringing the United States into
50 2
compliance with WTO rules.
At first glance, adopting a territorial system may seem like the
ideal solution to U.S. problems, since it would necessarily end EU
complaints regarding U.S. tax laws. However, several issues arise
when considering whether the United States should adopt a
territorial tax structure.
First, adopting such a system would
discourage U.S. exporting because, if products were produced in the
United States, they would be subject to U.S. taxation. On the other
hand, if products were produced outside the United States, in a low
tax jurisdiction, through international subsidiaries, the producer
could avoid paying U.S. taxes.
Under these circumstances, a
producer would most likely choose to produce outside the United
States, decreasing the level of U.S. exports. Furthermore, once
international subsidiaries are established as an alternative to
producing products in the United States, employment in the United
States will be significantly affected.
The second issue that arises in considering a conversion to a
territorial tax system is the amount of revenues that the U.S.
government would lose. Converting to a territorial tax structure
would reduce the number of taxable entities, thereby reducing U.S.
tax revenue collections. Considering the U.S. government relies
heavily on federal taxes to operate, 50 3 converting to a territorial tax
system does not seem consistent with the goal of the United States of
a0 4
maximizing its possible tax revenue collection.
A third problem arises when the United States considers
converting to a territorial tax structure. The WTO purports not to
endorse any particular tax structure. Abandoning the worldwide tax
scheme in favor of a territorial scheme would give the apprearance of
the WTO favoring one system over the other. 50 5 Moreover, if the
WTO is able to place such pressure on the United States, it suggests
serious limitations on the ability of the United States to shape the
international environment. 50 6 Thus, adoption of a tax structure that
in essence duplicates those in EU countries not only thwarts the U.S.
goal of being a world leader and trendsetter, but also frustrates the
WTO's goal of not endorsing any particular tax structure.
A fifth alternative is for the United States to maintain the
worldwide tax system as the basis for its tax structure and provide
subsidies to U.S. manufacturers, including exporters, that are not
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export-contingent. The idea would be to reform the tax code to reduce
taxes on earnings from all exports. 507 The panel, in its August 20,
2001 decision held that one way to cure the export-contingency would
be to eliminate the conditionality on exporting by making the subsidy
available irrespective of whether a product of national origin is sold
in the domestic market or abroad. 508 The panel stated that it was the
differential treatment provided for in the replacement law that
renders the replacement law contingent upon exporting. If the
contingency were eliminated, the subsidy alone would not violate U.S.
trade obligations. However, this alternative is not without problems.
It would reduce U.S. tax revenue. Such an outcome does not comport
with the U.S. goal of maximizing its possible tax revenue
50 9
collection.
A sixth choice would be for the United States to challenge the
EU tax scheme. 510 For example, it has long been asserted that
Airbus receives illegal subsidies from European governments. 511 The
proposal of a U.S. WTO suit against Europe over Airbus resurfaced
last summer after the European airplane producer said it would
launch a program that would be funded in part by government
loans. 5 12 Although, it is impossible to predict whether a claim
challenging the European tax code would be successful, bringing such
a claim against the European Union may prove beneficial by
encouraging the sides to reach a compromise solution. On the other
hand, filing a counter-claim may increase tensions between the two
sides and weaken the relationship between the United States and
European Union.

507.
A Gas tax hike, supra note 495.
508.
Second Report of the Panel, supra note 14.
509.
See generally supra notes 503-04 and accompanying text.
510.
Vago Muradian, Boeing PlansKey Air TransportMeeting, Step to U.S. WTO
Suit Against Airbus, DEFENSE DAILY INT'L, Sept. 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL
7476122.
511.
Id. For decades, Boeing has considered asking the U.S. government to file
suit against Airbus, claiming the European company enjoys what amount to
governmental subsidies to steadily grow its business. Id. U.S. officials have never filed
a suit against Airbus because senior Boeing executives have consistently balked at the
last minute under pressure from European air carriers that have asked the U.S. giant
to reconsider launching a messy trade dispute. Id.
512.
Id. Airbus accepted four billion dollars in loans below market rates from
Britain, France, Germany, and Spain to develop the A380 super jumbo jet under a
twelve billion dollar program. Id.
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IX. CONCLUSION
The outcome of the U.S.-EU tax dispute will have a significant
impact on transatlantic trade and particularly on the productivity of
U.S. exporters. Clearly, there is no simple solution to the dispute and
no solution will be ideal for the United States.
The ultimate U.S. goal is to promote its own economic interests
while at the same time fulfilling its WTO obligations. 513 As an effort
to fulfill this crucial goal, the Bush administration has been urged to
settle with the European Union in order to dilute the potential for a
trade war and void enormous pending sanctions. 514 Because the
United States seems to be in the weaker position under relevant
international treaties regarding the validity of the replacement law,
it would be wise for the United States to work diligently to reach a
compromise.
Likewise, the European Union has incentives to
compromise because imposing sanctions would not only harm the
U.S. economy but also the global economy, including that of the
European Union. Given that forty-five percent of world trade is
between Europe and the United States, 5 15 the stakes are too high for
the sides not to find a compromise solution.
Beyond the need to protect the global economy, the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks have given the United States and the
European Union additional incentives to reach a compromise solution
to the current tax dispute. Fighting trade war disputes may prove
more difficult in the wake of a decision by NATO that the terror
attacks against the United States constitute an assault on the entire
nineteen-member alliance. 5 16 This unprecedented NATO decision
will likely require dramatic increases in military and intelligence
cooperation among NATO allies. 517 It is crucial that NATO countries
not enter hostile relations with one another in light of this new war.
Considering the need to protect a fragile global economy and to
maintain strong international relationships, it seems appropriate for
the United States to modify the replacement law and for the
European Union to be flexible.
In making revisions to the
replacement law, it is also important that the United States not

513.
Farran Nehme, EU Eases Stance On Trade Sanctions After WTO Victory,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2001, at A12 (statement by U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick).
514.
Edward Lotterman, Foreign Sales Break Isn't Worth a Fight, KNIGHTRIDDER TRIB. BuS. NEws, Aug. 23, 2001, available at 2001 WL 26627346.
515.
U.S. Trade Policy Suffers, supra note 77, at Al.
516.
Muradian, supra note 510.
517.
See id.
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completely eradicate the level playing field U.S. businesses currently
enjoy in the international market. Thus, it seems that the United
States and European Union should continue their efforts to reach a
compromise solution. If it looks unlikely that a compromise will be
reached, it seems the United States should at least threaten, if not
actually file, a counter-complaint challenging the EU tax structure.
The primary purpose would be to put greater pressure on the
European Union to reach a compromise and to give the United States
the greater negotiating power needed to achieve a solution that meets
its objectives. Additionally, it seems revisions resembling those
suggested by the WTO-eliminating the conditionality on exporting
by making the subsidy available irrespective of whether a product of
national origin is sold in the domestic market or abroad-should be
the basis of the compromise.
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